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FOREWORD
In 1999, given the rapidly increasing public health importance of dengue, the disease was incorporated 
into the portfolios of the Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR), which 
is hosted at the World Health Organization (WHO) and co-sponsored by United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), the United Nations Development Pro gramme (UNDP), the World Bank and the World Health 
Organization (WHO). Then, in 2002, a World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolution, WHA55.17, urged 
greater commitment to tackling dengue among Member States and WHO. Of particular significance is 
the 2005 revision of the International Health Regulations (IHR)1 that includes dengue as an example of 
a disease that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern. It was against this 
background that the Scientific Working Group (SWG) on dengue comprising 60 experts from 20 coun-
tries was organized by TDR in October 2006. The aim was to review existing knowledge on dengue 
and establish priorities for future research. Priority dengue research areas were identified and organized 
around four major research streams intended to provide evidence and information for policy-makers 
and control programmes, and lead to more cost-effective strategies; those for dengue surveillance and 
outbreak response included the following recommendations (WHO/TDR, 2006).
•	 The	development	and	utilization	of	early	warning	and	response	systems.
•	 The	triggers	that	will	allow	effective	response	to	incipient	epidemics.
•	 Factors	leading	to	the	success	or	failure	of	national	programmes.
•	 Decision-making	that	results	in	a	declaration	of	state	of	emergency.	
•	 Analysis	of	the	context	of	dengue	surveillance	and	outbreak	management.
Since the publication of the updated edition of WHO’s Dengue: guidelines for diagnosis, treatment, prevention 
and control (WHO/TDR, 2009), new developments in dengue warrant an interim analysis of progress so 
far. According to the WHO handbook for the development of guidelines (WHO 2012a), precise high-level 
evidence is needed to do so, including systematic reviews. This requirement for systematic reviews 
arises from developing public health policy that is based on available research, which includes imple-
mentation and operational research, linking research and practice. The need to fill this gap in high-level 
evidence is particularly relevant in the context of neglected tropical diseases (Nagpal et al. 2013). In an 
interview-based study, Francis et al. (2014) found that policy-makers need systematic reviews that are:
…policy relevant, rigorous, and translatable to their local context, actionable, timely 
and well communicated...( that the) question should rather focus on the relevance to 
policymakers than the current scientific literature,...suggestions of how to enhance 
the usefulness of reviews to the policy process included the improved collaboration 
and engagement between policymakers and review authors around the identification 
of review topics and scope…. and a greater focus on heterogeneity of interventions, 
contexts and effectiveness. 
1  WHA58.3.
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This handbook was produced by TDR together with WHO’s Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTD) 
Department and WHO regional offices in the context of a European Union-financed research 
programme, the International Research Consortium on Dengue Risk Assessment, Management 
and Surveillance (IDAMS), to develop an evidence-based handbook for the early outbreak detec-
tion and management of dengue fever outbreaks. The handbook targets public health providers, 
in particular those at national level. It is not an implementation guideline, but a framework for 
developing a national contingency plan with local adaptations that acknowledge micro-level pro-
gramme components. Response planning requires contextual details encompassing the structure 
of the health and vector control services, the availability of infrastructure and budget, and human 
resources, and the willingness of staff to cooperate, among others. 
The aim of this “model contingency plan” is to assist programme managers and planners in devel-
oping a national, context-specific, dengue outbreak response plan in order to: (a) detect a dengue 
outbreak at an early stage through clearly defined and validated alarm signals; (b) precisely define 
when a dengue outbreak has started; and (c) organize an early response to the alarm signals or an 
“emergency response” once an outbreak has started. A summary of this document is published 
under Runge-Ranzinger et al. 2016.
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BCC behaviour change communication
BI Breteau index
°C degree Celsius
CI container index
COMBI Communication for Behavioural Impact
DENV Dengue virus
DENV-1 dengue virus serotype 1
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Chapter 1  
Introduction and methodology
1.1 Introduction 
Dengue, a mosquito-borne viral disease, is emerging as one of the world’s most rapidly spreading and important in-
fectious diseases of the 21st century (WHO, 2009; WHO, 2012b). A recent re-assessment of the dengue burden using 
novel modelling methods has shown that the dengue burden is about three times higher than estimated by WHO (Bhatt 
et al. 2013). Messina et al. (2014) showed the worldwide expansion of the serotypes of disease hyperendemicity, and 
the establishment of an increasingly important infectious disease of global public health significance. Other reviews of 
national epidemiological dengue data for Brazil, the Caribbean, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines and Thailand, spon-
sored by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the vaccine industry support these facts (Horstick & Morrison, 
2014a). The increasing global threat of dengue outbreaks in both endemic and non-endemic regions of the world has 
focused attention on effective outbreak management. 
Preparedness planning (used synonymously with outbreak response planning or contingency planning) has been de-
scribed as a way in which to augment the engagement of partners, build capacity and develop infrastructure, providing 
operational links to ensure a structured and coordinated response. Preparedness planning starts in the inter-epidemic 
phase and its success depends on the combination of year-round routine activities usually established in national dengue 
control plans, preparedness planning during the inter-epidemic phase, up-scaling of routine interventions, and timely 
and systematically initiated additional measures during an epidemic.
The national contingency plan should be distributed during the inter-epidemic phase to all relevant stakeholders (see 
Chapter 3), and mechanisms to ensure its implementation should be established. Checklist 1 summarizes the main 
components to be considered when developing a contingency plan, and a framework is attached in Annex 1.
Dengue outbreak response has been defined as the sum of measures specifically addressing a dengue outbreak aimed 
at reducing case fatality rates, numbers of cases and entomological parameters (Pilger et al. 2010). Early detection of 
outbreaks is important for timely response and the alarm signals triggering the early response need to be established 
(Chapter 3). 
Timely response is essential for mitigating the enormous social and economic costs of a dengue outbreak.1 Stakeholder 
involvement as an important element in outbreak response is presented in detail in Chapter 3.
1 Costs of outbreaks have been investigated by a literature review and cost evaluations in four countries revealing that only one paper (Baly et al. 2011) addresses the 
costs of outbreaks explicitly and methodologically accurately in a prospective study. Nevertheless, one review showed that the costs of dengue control interventions 
are much lower than actual outbreak costs if the outbreak is left uncontrolled. In the case study, the findings of the literature review have been confirmed: it is 
much cheaper to prevent dengue outbreaks than to pay for the consequences of an outbreak in terms of treatment costs and additional costs for vector control and 
information, education and communication (IEC) activities (Stahl et al. 2013).
2
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Introduction, preparedness planning and management
CHECKLIST 1. GENERAL RECOMMANDATIONS FOR NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS PLANNING 
Its is recommeded to:
1. Ensure a minimal documented accountability for each intervention (“who is responsible for what”), 
defining a person or units/agencies/institutions to be in charge of certain activities
2. Ensure that a dengue contingency plan contains detailed instructions
3. Distinguish between the routine interventions that should be performed in the inter-epidemic period 
(particularly in advance of the seasonal peak of cases), and outbreak interventions during the outbreak 
(that is, between the up-scaling of preventive interventions before the dengue season starts and 
specific outbreak procedures)
4. Ensure continuity between surveillance, outbreak alerts, outbreak confirmation, outbreak declaration 
and response
5. Ensure that governance during the response has the regulatory framework in place and the means to 
oversee activities and interventions
6. Highlight all stakeholders to be involved (refer to Table 6)
7. Include human-resource preparedness planning for all sectors
8. Ensure that instructions on training are included and implemented
9. Provide details on monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of preparedness activities and response
10. Ensure that the dengue contingency plan is sufficiently distributed and implemented
1.2 Methodology
In response to the research areas formulated by the 2006 TDR Scientific Working Group (SWG) around the development 
and utilization of early warning and response systems and triggers/factors that will allow effective response to incipient 
epidemics, several systematic literature reviews were undertaken by: Heintze, Garrido & Kroeger (2007); Erlanger, Keiser 
& Utzinger (2008); Runge-Ranzinger et al. (2008; 2014); Esu, Lenhart & Horstick (2010); Pilger et al. (2010); Horstick 
et al. (2010; 2014b); Boyce et al. (2013); Stahl et al. (2013); Bowman, Runge-Ranzinger & McCall (2014); George  et 
al. (2015); Han et al. (2015), Lazaro et al. (2015); and Bowman, Donegan & McCall (2016a).
In a second step, factors were identified that lead to the success or failure of national programmes, and decision-making 
that results in a declaration of a state of emergency. Analyses were undertaken of stakeholders’ perceptions in the con-
text of dengue surveillance and outbreak management, practical application needs and the identification of additional 
knowledge gaps. These analyses were conducted in Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand (Rediguieri, 
2009; Runge-Ranzinger, 2010; Yusadiredja, 2010), leading to additional systematic reviews as well as a comparative 
analysis of dengue contingency plans including a gap analysis (Harrington et al. 2013) to cover all relevant items for 
dengue contingency planning. Finally, a multi-country study was conducted assessing dengue contingency planning 
in 10 countries (Badurdeen et al. 2013) focused specifically on policy-makers’ perceptions of outbreak management. 
The study included several meetings of experts and policy-makers to assure their involvement and capture their needs 
during the process. For the development of an alert algorithm for dengue outbreaks, an expert technical group identified 
potential alarm indicators from the literature and their experience, and agreed on the ones to incorporate into a phase 
of retrospective testing and model development.
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In a third step, using epidemiological and alarm signals data from Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Malaysia, Mexico 
and Viet Nam (Bowman et al. 2016b), a retrospective analysis of those alarm indicators was undertaken and a model 
for outbreak alert developed. This model is currently e valuated in a prospective controlled trial in order to be piloted 
in a study over 18 months in three countries (Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico) to assess its feasibility and cost effectiveness. 
This trial is also focusing on the use of a ‘staged response’, where specific interventions (improved use of surveillance 
information, timely application of response activities as per national guidelines, vector control strategies) are activated or 
deployed in response to the presence of specific alarm signals. The overall results are summarized in this handbook as 
described above, in order to assist programme managers and planners in the development of best possible evidence-based 
dengue outbreak response planning in a specific context.
The lead writer chose a group of peer reviewers, not excluding any potential peer reviewer for a particular view. The 
peer reviewers were not paid for their work. Declarations of interest were obtained from all of them and no conflicting 
interests were declared.
For each chapter, the resolution of disputed issues arising from the reviewers’ comments was achieved through discus-
sion with the lead writer using electronic mail.
Examples are given in text boxes and the evidence from literature reviews in footnotes.
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Chapter 2  
Dengue surveillance  
2.1 Passive disease surveillance2 
2.1.1 Challenges of the routine surveillance system
Passive routine reporting of dengue cases as the backbone of epidemiological information monitors the spatial and tem-
poral distribution of dengue in its different clinical expressions, determines the risk and priority areas for interventions, 
and serves as a trigger for outbreak alert. However severe underreporting, especially of non-hospitalized dengue cases (in 
addition to those not reported due to asymptomatic or mild disease not presenting to health services and/or non-users 
of the public health sector and others), is an issue. For an alert system to trigger actions, the surveillance system needs 
to be: (a) sensitive in predicting or detecting an outbreak in a timely manner; and (b) specific to avoid unnecessary false 
alerts. When the sensitivity of an alarm signal increases, the specificity decreases and vice versa, but the optimal level 
of sensitivity⁄specificity is unclear (Runge-Ranzinger et al. 2008; 2014).3
The following aspects are of importance in a national surveillance system:
•	 the use of a simplified and standardized case classification, available with the revised WHO case classification,4 see 
Annex 2 (WHO/TDR, 2009; Horstick et al. 2014b);
•	 improved laboratory support through standardized and quality-controlled testing procedures (WHO/TDR, 2009);
•	 the addition of active/enhanced/syndromic surveillance components (Runge-Ranzinger et al. 2008; 2014; Brady et 
al. 2015).
2 Passive surveillance relies on standardized reporting forms provided by the state or local health departments. These completed forms are returned to the health 
department when cases of disease are detected. Passive reporting systems are generally less costly than other reporting systems, and data collection is not 
burdensome to health officials, but the challenge is how to increase the reporting mentality of health providers and ensure standardized case classification (Thacker 
et al. 1986).
3 It is not yet clear how sensitive the surveillance data need to be (level of underreporting accepted) in order to fulfil its purpose: (a) to reflect disease trends 
accurately; and (b) to serve as a baseline for early alert. However, it seems that to a certain extent, underreporting can be tolerated in high-endemic settings, as long 
as data are representative and, ideally, laboratory supported (Runge-Ranzinger et al. 2008; 2014). 
4 A systematic review of the published studies and an expert consensus based on regional research comparing the two classifications has been published (Horstick 
et al. 2014b; 2015). 12 studies were performed after the publication of the 2009 WHO case classification and most were performed in Asia with the exception of 
three studies – one that included 18 study sites worldwide (Barniol et al. 2011), one study from Nicaragua and one study from Peru. Ten expert opinion articles 
were used for discussion. The 2009 WHO case classification studies show: (1) that when determining severe dengue, sensitivity was measured between 59% and 
98% (88% and 98% for the two prospective studies), and specificity was between 41% and 99%, (99% for the prospective study); when comparing the 1997 WHO 
classification with that of 2009, the sensitivity was lower between 24.8% and 89.9% (24.8% and 74% for the prospective studies); specificity for the 1997 WHO case 
classification was 25% and 100% (100% from the prospective study); (2) it is easy to apply the 2009 WHO case classification; (3) for (non-severe) dengue as defined 
in the 2009 WHO case classification, there may be a risk of monitoring increased dengue case numbers; and (4) studies are needed to further validate the warning 
signs.
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Dengue surveillance
a Jajosky & Groseclose (2004).
b Tourdjman, Huy & Vong (2005); Standish et al. (2010); Wichmann et al. (2011); 
Vong et al. (2012); Undurraga, Halasa & Shepar (2013).
c CDC (2001).
Sources: Rediguieri (2009); Beatty et al. (2010); Runge-Ranzinger (2010); Yusa-
diredja (2010); Abdulla (2011).
Elements that were suggested to potentially improve the passive surveillance system are summarized in Checklist 2. 
It should be noted that harmonization with national surveillance guidelines is crucial.
CHECKLIST 2. ELEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
1. Objectives of the surveillance system(s) should be clear to all stakeholders
2. Terminology of dengue surveillance should be described and consistent
3. Dengue notification should be mandatory
4. National guidelines for dengue/disease surveillance should be distributed
5. Both suspected and confirmed dengue cases should be reported
6. Timeliness of all reporting steps should be optimized (Flowchart 1)a
7. The sensitivity of disease surveillance for early alert can be increased by including the private sector, all health units 
including outpatient departments, all age groups and by adding enhancement strategies 
8. Usage of easy to apply notification forms,5 standardized data entry processes and electronic-based reporting
9. Clear data flow including timely information feedback, defined responsibilities and linkage to response should be in 
place 
10. Continuous data analysis including the lowest possible level of the health system by a defined team of 
epidemiologists should be ensured
11. Serosurveys to calculate an expansion/correction factor should be considered in order to: (1) assess the level of 
underreporting; and (2) calculate the national burden of diseaseb 
12. Regular internal and external evaluations of the routine surveillance system to improve quality standards should be 
organized, a possible format is given in CDC (2001)c 
13. The specificity of dengue information can be improved by quality-controlled laboratory support. Laboratory 
networks are crucial 
14. Laboratory confirmation of all dengue suspected cases, mainly with immunoglobulin M (IgM) and immunoglobulin 
G (IgG) enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and increasingly with non-structural protein (NS-1) should be 
envisaged
15. During outbreaks, a small fraction of suspected cases should be tested (for example, 10–30%)
16. Regular training for epidemiologists, clinicians, laboratory staff and others should be ensured so that staff are 
knowledgeable about case definitions and case management
17. Alarm signals with a threshold level (‘trigger’) to initiate activities should be identified (example: excess of reported 
dengue cases >2 standard deviation (SD) of the five-year average),6 see details in Chapter 3.
5 For example, see http://www.cve.saude.sp.gov.br/htm/outros/fichas/FICHA_DENGUE_ONLINE_2014.pdf (accessed 8 May 2016).
6 The following indicators for detecting the deviation of reported dengue cases or laboratory results from ‘average’ (pattern recognition technique) have been tested: 
two or more epidemic months (i.e. months with reported dengue cases more than 1 SD above the monthly average) based on the retrospective analysis of dengue 
reporting (population based) in a passive surveillance system in Thailand (Barbazan, Yoksan & Gonzalez, 2002); an excess of reported cases of dengue notifications 
(population-based) >2 SD above the average in a routine surveillance system in Puerto Rico (Rigau-Pérez et al. 1999); and Viet Nam where the level of increase 
above average was not mentioned (Tien et al. 1999).
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Flowchart 1. Steps to analyse reporting time 
Source: CDC (2004).
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2.1.2 Monitoring and evaluation of the surveillance system
Periodic internal and external evaluation of the passive routine surveillance system is needed to assess the minimum 
requirements for achieving the objectives. These evaluations include information on the system’s purpose, process, 
outcome attributes, analysis and use of collected data as well as public health impact. Opportunities for improvement 
should be identified and acted on. 
In a framework for the evaluation of public health surveillance systems, the usefulness of a disease surveillance system 
has been described as the sum of all outcome attributes listed as below in Table 1 (CDC, 2001).
Table 1. Assessing a public health surveillance system
Attributes Brief definition
Sensitivity Proportion of case/outbreaks detected out of all cases/outbreaks
Timeliness Speed between detection, reporting and response
Stability Ability to collect, manage and provide data properly
Simplicity Ease of operation of the surveillance system
Flexibility Ability to adapt during an epidemic and applicability in other settings
Data quality Completeness and validity of the data recorded
PPV Proportion of reported cases, actually having dengue
Representativeness Ability to describe spatial and temporal dengue distribution in the whole population
Acceptability Willingness of persons and organizations to participate 
Accuracy/specificity Ability to distinguish between a dengue outbreak and another outbreaks, between a 
dengue case and another illness, and between dengue and severe dengue 
Determined by especially representativeness, data quality, PPV, specificity of case 
definition
Usefulness Sum of all attributes, documents the contribution to prevention and control, systems 
effect on policy decisions and control programmes
PPV: positive predictive value.
Sources: adapted from CDC (2001).
Several country evaluations have been performed using an adapted version. The summarized findings are presented 
below in Example 1 (Chairulfatah et al. 2001; Hyo-Soon Yoo et al. 2009; Rediguieri, 2009; Runge-Ranzinger, 2010; 
Yusadiredja 2010; Abdulla, 2011).
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EXAMPLE 1. COUNTRY EVALUATIONS IN FOUR COUNTRIES IN ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA 
Sensitivity
Factors explaining the high rate of underreporting (that is, low sensitivity) in the four study countries: (1) low 
sensitivity of the clinical case definition/classification; (2) underuse of health services (particularly for mild disease); 
(3) reporting by the public sector only, limited to certain age groups or inpatients; (4) limited contribution to the 
surveillance system in some countries; and (5) difficulties of classifying dengue with the previous dengue case 
classification – DF, dengue haemorrhagic fever (DHF), dengue shock syndrome (DSS). The sensitivity of outbreak 
detection depends on the accuracy of case reporting, the sensitivity of the epidemiological threshold, and the use 
of additional alarm signals.
Specificity/accuracy
Accuracy of case reporting was an issue in all settings as additional studies on the quality of the reporting process 
of cases have only been done in exceptional circumstances. Accuracy can be increased by laboratory confirmation 
(as highlighted in Brazil). The alarm signals to detect outbreaks seem to be generally too specific rather than too 
sensitive, as false alerts were not mentioned as a problem in the four countries. The inaccuracy of rumour alerts 
and the reluctant response to alerts due to mistrust in data quality was repeatedly mentioned as a problem.
Timeliness and acceptability of reporting and response
Timeliness depended primarily on the processes within the integrated public health reporting system. Early data 
entry seems crucial, and manual (paper-based) reporting a disadvantage. Further to this, the reporting process 
from the reporting institution (for example, health centre, clinic, etc.) to the local public health facility, which 
was often in a dengue-specific form, was time-consuming. This was because forms were manually delivered 
and variables to be reported were only available after the patient was discharged. The other cause of delay was 
slow data analysis, which was done either on a weekly or a monthly basis. The delay in the investigation of 
an event was mainly due to delayed data analysis or missing alarm signals for an outbreak investigation. Local 
investigations were faster, but less accurate due to missing human skills and laboratory support. Response at the 
local level (depending on local outbreak definitions or case-based approaches) was often in time, but response 
from higher levels based on thresholds of epidemiological data was often delayed. Reasons for this were said to 
be that interventions for the outbreak response were costly and data too inaccurate to launch a response. 
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2.2 Enhanced surveillance 
Overview
Routine surveillance is the backbone of dengue information but there are other tools that strengthen the information 
system. These systems either contribute with additional alarm signals or increase data quality and/or timeliness. The po-
tential value of enhanced surveillance lies in combining tools that complement the routine reporting but do not replace it. 
Enhanced surveillance during the inter-epidemic period includes:
a) epidemiological sub-analysis of routinely reported data
b) syndromic surveillance 
c) laboratory-based dengue reporting
d) other active surveillance approaches.
The options for enhanced surveillance to be selected by countries are presented below.
2.2.1 Epidemiological data sub-analysis
Dengue cases are reported to the authorities and the number of reported cases or incidence rates are analysed. Often 
additional information is available about age, disease outcome (disease severity including deaths), and geographical 
location of the cases. These data can provide useful information about a shift in age group distribution or increased 
numbers of hospitalized patients, which could be associated with a new serotype or with high transmission areas. They 
can also be used to monitor the spatio-temporal distribution of the disease.
Unfortunately, the final disease outcome (level of severity) can often only be reported at the end of the disease, so that 
a patient may be recorded at the beginning as “suspected dengue” and at the end as “severe dengue,” which may com-
plicate the reporting system. 
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2.2.2 Syndromic surveillance 
Syndromic surveillance was developed as an additional tool for the early alert of aberrant patterns in order to detect an 
outbreak early on. It is used here in a broader perspective and not limited to clinical syndromic definitions (syndroms) 
only. It may be based on increased numbers of school absenteeism, increased laboratory requests or proportion of positive 
laboratory results in the inter-epidemic period. In order to react in a timely manner, the systems are electronically based 
and use automated alerts when specific events pass a given threshold. These alarm signals can be used in an integrated 
risk assessment tool. The purpose of syndromic surveillance has been described in the following way (Henning, 2004): 
Syndromic surveillance has been used for early detection of outbreaks, to follow the size, spread, and speed 
of outbreaks, to monitor disease trends, and to provide reassurance that an outbreak has not occurred. 
Syndromic surveillance systems use existing health data in real time to provide immediate analysis and 
feedback to investigation staff and decision makers and follow-up of potential outbreaks. Stakeholders 
need to understand the advantages and limitations of syndromic surveillance systems. However, syn-
dromic surveillance does not replace traditional public health surveillance, nor does it substitute for direct 
physician reporting of unusual or suspect cases of public health importance. 
Table 2. Data sources for syndromic surveillance
Potential data sources Potential alternative data sources
•	 Emergency	department	or	total	patient	volume	in	
hospital
•	 Total	hospital	or	intensive-care	unit	admissions	from	
an emergency department
•	 Emergency	department	algorithms	for	chief	
complaints
•	 Outpatient	department
•	 Emergency	medical	care	system
•	 Provider	hotline:	increase	of	certain	main	complaints
•	 Poison	control	centre
•	 Unexplained	deaths
•	 Medical	examiners:	increase	of	specific	syndromes
•	 Insurance	claims	or	billing	data
•	 Clinical	laboratory	or	radiology:	ordering	volume
•	 School	absenteeism	(from	primary	and	secondary	
schools)
•	 Work	absenteeism	(from	defined	companies)
•	 Over-the-counter	medication	sales	(from	pharmacies)
•	 Health-care	provider	data-based	searches
•	 Volume	of	internet-based	health	inquiries	by	the	
public (social networks)
•	 Internet-base	illness	reporting	(social	networks)
Source: adapted from Henning (2004).
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Syndromic surveillance may contribute important data on alarm signals in early warning systems for dengue outbreaks. 
A number of variables that potentially provide predictive warning have been identified (see Example 2).
EXAMPLE 2. ALARM SIGNALS FOR SYNDROMIC DENGUE SURVEILLANCE:  APPROACHES REPORTED 
IN THE LITERATURE 
Increase of virus positivity rate
Increased virus isolation rate as a percentage of positive blood samples for dengue viruses in the low season 
based on routine virological surveillance was used as an alarm signal in Puerto Rico (Rigau-Pérez et al. 2001; 
Rigau-Pérez & Clark, 2005) and Viet Nam (Tien et al. 1999). In Singapore during the 2007/2008 epidemic, the 
proportion of dengue virus (DENV) positive samples detected by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) rose from 
57.9% in January 2007 to 91.0% in July 2007 at the peak of transmission (Lee et al. 2010), which was similar to 
the situation in Puerto Rico (Rigau-Pérez & Clark, 2005).
Increased malaria negative rate in fever patients in a malaria-endemic area
Increased numbers of dengue cases were detected when in fever patients the malaria positivity rate went down 
in French Guiana (Carme et al. 2003). Currently no judgement is possible, as this depends on the local setting.
Fevers or clinical syndromic definitions
Reported fever cases were used as an indicator in community-based surveillance systems. In Cambodia, an 
active community-based surveillance system using a syndromic definition (diagnostic algorithm) for haemorrhagic 
fevers increased case reporting in non-users of health services (64% of all cases) (Oum, Chandramohan & 
Cairncross, 2005). This approach was supposed to be more rapid and useful for the detection of focal, small-scale 
transmission. In Madagascar, a sentinel- based syndromic surveillance system for six diseases was evaluated. 
It detected 10 outbreaks, five were confirmed, two of which were dengue (Randianasolo et al. 2010). In French 
Guiana, a syndromic clinical surveillance system in a military population was compared with routine laboratory 
reporting (Meynard et al. 2008). Both were complementary but the syndromic approach detected an outbreak 
3–4 weeks earlier and was six times more sensitive than laboratory-based surveillance, though the specificity 
was lower. A further analysis, using Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) criteria showed that the 
ideal reporting time was often not achieved due to barriers encountered with data entry. The risk of false alerts 
needs to be considered but all respondents perceived that this system detects outbreaks adequately (Jefferson 
et al. 2008). The subsequent countrywide introduction of sentinel-based syndromic reporting in French Guiana 
identified 80 signals for confirmed cases, 64 for clinical cases and predicted three major epidemics (Flamand et 
al. 2011). In Bolivia and Cuba, fever alert for the purpose of outbreak detection was not useful (Pirard et al. 1997; 
Kouri, 1998).
Rate of school absenteeism 
Rocha et al. 2009, Lawpoolsri et al. 2014 and Fan et al. 2014 investigated the use of school absenteeism with 
mixed and context specific results. 
Search Query Surveillance 
Chan et al. 2011, Althouse et al. 2011, Hoen et al. 2012 and Gluskin et al. 2014 found that data on Internet 
searches and event-based surveillance correlated well with the epidemic curve derived from surveillance data, 
suggesting that this method may be useful to predict outbreaks.
13
T
R
A
IN
IN
G
 M
A
N
U
A
L
Technical handbook for dengue surveillance, dengue outbreak prediction/detection and outbreak response
2.2.3 Laboratory support of routine reporting
Purpose of laboratory testing
The purpose of laboratory support for dengue outbreak control is to: 
•	 verify the clinical diagnosis for clinical management and outbreak confirmation;
•	 directly report positive test results to the authorities for surveillance purposes;
•	 increase the specificity of the reporting system by reporting laboratory confirmed cases instead of clinically suspected 
cases;7
•	 contribute to the syndromic surveillance system (for example, identify increased number of requests); 
•	 generate sero/genotype specific data as an additional alarm signal.
General characteristics of dengue tests in the laboratory
Before day five of illness, dengue infections may be diagnosed by virus isolation in cell culture, by detection of viral 
ribonucleic acid (RNA); by nucleic acid amplification tests (NAAT), or by detection of viral antigens (for example, 
NS-1) by ELISA or rapid tests (for interpretation see Fig. 1). Virus isolation in cell culture is usually performed only in 
laboratories with the necessary infrastructure and technical expertise. NS-1 antigen detection kits, now commercially 
available, can be used in laboratories with limited equipment and yield results within a few hours. Rapid dengue antigen 
detection tests can be used in field settings and provide results in less than an hour. Currently, these assays are not sero-
type-specific, are expensive and are under evaluation for diagnostic accuracy and cost-effectiveness in multiple settings. 
The dengue guide summarizes in Chapter IV various dengue diagnostic methods and their cost (WHO/TDR, 2009).
For serological testing, the time of specimen collection is more flexible than that for virus isolation or RNA detection 
because an antibody response can be measured by comparing a sample collected during the acute stage of illness with 
samples collected weeks or months later. Low levels of a detectable dengue IgM response – or the absence of it – in 
some secondary infections reduce the diagnostic accuracy of IgM ELISA tests. Results of rapid tests may be available 
within less than one hour.
7 This would allow the surveillance system to adopt a more sensitive clinical definition without loss in specificity.
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Fig. 1. Interpretation of dengue diagnostic tests
Highly suggestive Confirmed
One of the following:
1. IgM + in a single serum sample
2. IgG + in a single serum sample with a HI titre 
 of 1280 or greater 
One of the following:
1. PCR+
2. Virus culture +
3. IgM seroconversion in paired sera
4. IgG seroconversion in paired sera or fourlfold
  IgG titer increased in paired sera
HI: house index; PCR: polymerase chain reaction; IgG: immunoglobulin G; IgM: immunoglobulin M.
Source: adapted from dengue control (DENCO) study (WHO/TDR, 2009).
Unfortunately, an ideal diagnostic test that permits early and rapid diagnosis, affordable for different health systems, 
easy to perform, and with robust performance, is not yet available.
The dengue tests usually employed during the clinical illness are presented in Fig. 2 – see WHO/TDR (2009), tables 
4.1 and 4.3, pages 93 and 96, respectively, for a summary of operating characteristics. But under resource constraints, 
it is important to consider additional ways to identify dengue outbreaks with limited availability of laboratory tests. 
Fig. 2. Course of dengue illness
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The national contingency document should precisely specify how laboratory surveillance is going to function in an 
outbreak. For example, will laboratory surveillance just be used to confirm an outbreak or will it be performed con-
tinuously throughout an outbreak? What tests should be used, and to whom they should be sent, etc.? A flowchart 
and clear standard operating procedures (SOPs) are required. Details of laboratory-specific issues to be considered in 
a country contingency plan are summarized in Checklist 3. 
Laboratory testing for outbreak investigations
During outbreaks, patients may present with fever with or without rash during the acute illness, others may present 
with signs of plasma leakage or shock, while others show signs of haemorrhage. Others may be observed during the 
convalescent phase. One of the priorities in a suspected outbreak is to re-confirm the causative agent (if it is dengue) 
so that appropriate public health and clinical measures can be taken. Samples collected from febrile patients could be 
tested by nucleic acid methods in a well-equipped laboratory or a broader spectrum of laboratories using an ELISA-based 
dengue antigen detection kit. If specimens are collected after day five of illness, commercial IgM ELISA or sensitive 
dengue IgM rapid tests may suggest a dengue outbreak, but results are preferably confirmed with reliable serological 
tests performed in a reference laboratory with broad arbovirus diagnostic capability. Serological assays may be used to 
determine the extent of outbreaks.
Dengue surveillance systems aim to detect the circulation of specific viruses in human or mosquito populations. The 
diagnostic tools should be sensitive, specific and affordable for the country. Laboratories responsible for surveillance 
are often national reference laboratories.  
CHECKLIST 3. LABORATORY-SPECIFIC ISSUES FOR A NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN
1. Laboratory confirmation of reported cases is recommended, but also suspected (probable) cases should be  
reported
2. Laboratories should report positive results directly to the surveillance system
3. Details for viral isolation, PCR, NS-1 ELISA, serological confirmation by IgM IgG, rapid diagnostic test (RDT) use, 
storage and transport of samples should be provided (see WHO/TDR, 2009)
4. The purpose of tests, test results and their interpretation should be stated
5. A flowchart about timing of tests and destination of samples should be provided
6. Laboratory specific processes of outbreak investigation and confirmation should be defined
7. Quality control of laboratory tests should be ensured (usually by the reference laboratory)
8. Training and capacity building for laboratory staff should be implemented
9. Prevention of stockouts in the laboratories should be in place
10. Laboratory networks need to be established
11. Information about the circulating serotype/genotype should be documented and used for surveillance purposes 
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Other forms of active surveillance8
Other forms of active surveillance can complement the enhancement strategies of a routine surveillance system described 
above, for example: 
a) sentinel surveillance9
b) active case finding 
c) motivation, calls and other outreach activities. 
2.2.4 Sentinel surveillance 
Virus surveillance is often performed in: (a) sentinel sites, mainly major hospitals, by sending a randomized subsample 
of blood specimens to national laboratories for serotyping and genotyping; (b) syndromic surveillance approaches are 
often sentinel based (Randrianasolo et al. 2010; Kuan et al. 2010); (c) in some systems, data are from a subsample of 
dengue patients, the information is analysed in depth so increasing data quality and allowing for more comprehensive 
laboratory testing – however, it is important to ensure representativeness of sentinel sites by proper randomization of 
samples (Huy et al. 2010); (d) sometimes travellers are used as sentinels when returning from disease endemic coun-
tries (Domingo et al. 2011; Schwartz et al.  2008), and the results are reported to international surveillance networks. 
2.2.5 Active case finding
Active case finding around a dengue index case is appropriate to confirm local transmission or to investigate an imported 
case. Also it could help to assess the size of a local outbreak. See experience from Cuba (Kouri, 1998) and Taiwan (King 
et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2010). 
2.2.6 Motivation
Different motivation strategies have been developed in order to improve doctors’ and nurses’ reporting mentality. This 
might be done by telephone calls10 asking for the cases to be reported, but it might require additional staff.11
8 Active surveillance involves outreach by the public authority, such as regular telephone calls or visits to laboratories, hospitals and providers to stimulate reporting 
of specific diseases. It places intensive demands on resources and should be limited to specific purposes (Thacker et al 1986).
9 Sentinel surveillance is a special form of active surveillance. It involves collecting case data from a sample of providers and then extrapolating them to a larger 
population. The advantage is that it is less expensive (being restricted to small areas) and produces data of higher quality. The disadvantage is the inability to ensure 
that the sample population is representative (Thacker et al. 1986).
10 Passive surveillance plus sentinel sites using telephone calls with virus surveillance in Cambodia increased the sensitivity of detecting outbreaks (defined as 
crossing of case numbers the 2 SD line above the mean) (Runge-Ranzinger, 2010).
11 One study described an enhanced routine surveillance system in Puerto Rico by motivating public health staff which resulted in an increased incidence of reported 
dengue three times above the incidence during the two most recent epidemics in 1994 and 1998 (Ramos et al. 2008).
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2.2.7 Entomological surveillance
“Standard” entomological indicators of the presence of the urban yellow fever vector and dengue vector were developed 
primarily for monitoring the progress of the Aedes aegypti eradication campaign in the Americas in the late 1940s. The 
three classic Stegomyia indices – the house (or premise) index (HI), the container index (CI), and the Breteau index (BI) 
– are all based on the presence or absence of immature stages of the vector in water-holding containers and confined 
natural habits close to or inside dwellings or other buildings. When vector densities are very low, ovitraps have been 
used to determine presence or absence of the vector. While these indices can be used to monitor discrete abundance 
changes in localized areas, they do not define how much vector control would be needed to reduce, interrupt or prevent 
viral transmission – indeed no standardized, evidence-based thresholds exist (Bowman, Runge-Ranzinger & McCall, 
2014). Of particular concern is that such thresholds for vector control measures in dengue are influenced by a variety 
of factors, especially serotype-specific (and perhaps genotype-specific) herd immunity and temperature. Focks (2003) 
showed that the pupal productivity survey technique was promising in identifying those container habitats that contrib-
uted disproportionately higher numbers of adult vectors, and thereby guide programme managers in the application of 
more cost effective, targeted approaches (Tun-Lin et al. 2009). It was envisaged that pupal productivity surveys could 
help to elucidate the transmission dynamics and identify the risks of dengue transmission (Nathan et al. 2006) by 
complementing “larval surveys” as a routine vector surveillance tool. Table 3 shows the attempt by Focks et al. (1995; 
2000) to estimate the requisite vector abundance (using pupae per person  – PPP – as a proxy measure) that would 
result in ≥10% rise in sero-prevalence of dengue antibody during the course of a year under conditions of a single viral 
introduction by one or two viraemic individual(s) (in brackets in Table 3) on day 90 of the year. In a series of simulations 
in a Dengue Simulation Model (DENSiM), these values resulted in a ≥10% rise in prevalence approximately 50% of the 
time (Focks et al. 2000). This means that at 32° C environmental temperature in a population with no herd immunity 
(sero-prevalence = 0), only 0.07 PPP are sufficient to increase the sero-prevalence in this community by 10% or more. 
In a community with 67% sero-prevalence, 0.26 PPP is needed for a similar increase. In areas with temperatures of 22 
°C, it would require 30.55 for the same effect.
Table 3. Transmission thresholds by initial sero-prevalence of antibody
Temperature (°C) 0% 33% 67%
22 9.57 (9.16) 14.10 (12.83) 30.55 (29.15)
24 2.92 (2.68) 4.47 (4.21) 9.22 (8.68)
26 1.42 (1.23) 2.03 (1.98) 4.26 (4.01)
28 0.53 (0.48) 0.75 (0.72) 1.69 (1.38)
30 0.13 (0.12) 0.19 (0.18) 0.38 (0.35)
32 0.07 (0.07) 0.10 (0.10) 0.26 (0.18)
Source: Focks et al. (1995; 2000).
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A systematic literature review found little evidence of quantifiable associations between vector indices and dengue trans-
mission that could reliably be used for outbreak prediction. It highlighted the need for standardized sampling protocols 
that adequately consider dengue spatial heterogeneity. Single values of BI or other indices were not considered reliable 
universal dengue transmission thresholds, especially the traditionally used BI where a threshold of BI>5 was shown to 
be inappropriate (Bowman, Runge-Ranzinger & McCall, 2014). 
In summary, entomological indices may have a potential for outbreak alert, but the evidence is weak (see also Gubler, 
2002). Additionally, the operational issues of routine vector surveillance are often hampered by the lack of resources, 
lack of local-level involvement in decision-making, limitations in supervision, increasing vector resistance to larvicides 
and difficulty in interpreting entomological indices (Badurdeen et al. 2013).
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Chapter 3  
Outbreak alert and outbreak detection 
3.1 Seasonal increase of cases
The seasonal increase of dengue cases, usually during or just after the rainy season (see Fig. 3) has to be distinguished 
from the unexpected increase of cases above a defined threshold, which is usually called an outbreak (Stroup et al. 1989; 
Heymann, 2004). The number of reported cases exceeding expected levels is referred to as “aberrations” (Farrington & 
Andrews, 2004). Dengue control and clinical care systems need to respond differently to each of these scenarios. The 
expected increase of dengue vectors and subsequently of cases during the “dengue season” requires routine measures be 
stepped up at a relatively predictable point each year. The annual need for increased vector control staff should correspond 
to the weeks when the vector density increases, and preparations should be made for adequate staffing levels, equipment 
and supply (including chemicals and/or biological agents, IEC materials and other elements of social mobilization). 
Similarly, clinical services’ annual plans should define the additional staff, equipment, reagents and treatment units 
needed, and identify whether clinical refresher courses are required. The dengue outbreak as an “unexpected increase 
of cases” requires additional efforts complementing the above mentioned as described below.
3.2 Outbreak as an unexpected increase of cases
3.2.1 Outbreak definition 
From a public health perspective, a clear and universally accepted definition of an outbreak is important even if the 
thresholds of case numbers may vary among countries or regions. A standardized outbreak definition can help to send 
uniform messages to inform the general public and make the outbreak analysis comparable within and between coun-
tries. However, it has to be emphasized that the response to an outbreak should be triggered much earlier than the start 
of the outbreak. Possible thresholds and alert algorithms are described below.
3.2.2 Challenges of using surveillance data for detecting an outbreak 
Outbreak definitions based on thresholds of epidemiological data (number of cases or incidence rate) rely on the timely 
analysis of local surveillance data (for example, at district level and the number of cases per week) to establish if cases are 
above a pre-defined threshold, which varies according the season. The reliance on surveillance data to detect an outbreak 
at an early stage is challenging when there is inadequate data to determine a reference or baseline value. Thresholds, 
such as an excess of reported dengue cases in low- or high-transmission seasons above a defined level (for example, z 
times SD above the “moving mean” of cases in the previous five years), have been considered useful (Stroup et al. 1989; 
Rigau-Perez et al. 1999). However such thresholds should be integrated into a locally adapted early warning tool that 
also includes other alarm signals. 
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A multi-country study in 10 countries found a wide variety of outbreak definitions used as the alert threshold (Badu-
rdeen et al. 2013).
3.2.3 Definitions of a dengue outbreak showing marked differences
•	 Case numbers 2 SD above the mean of the preceding five years shown in endemic channels – Columbia, 
the Dominican Republic, Peru (partially), Viet Nam (national level).
•	 Case numbers >2 SD “4–weekly average” above the mean of “three 4-weekly averages” in the five preceding 
years (“moving mean” in Brazil; in Malaysia the five-year moving median is used as an alert at state and 
national levels).
•	 > 300 cases per 100 000 population at the local level (Brazil).
•	 > 10 cases per week in a local area (Sri Lanka).
•	 Two or more connected dengue cases at local level (in Malaysia and Mexico, and partially in Sri Lanka).
•	 Case number in a commune within two weeks:  2–20 cases = mild outbreak; 20–100 cases = moderate 
outbreak; > 100 cases = severe outbreak (Viet Nam).
•	 No clear outbreak definition but larval indices as trigger for response: BI <6= routine response; BI = 6–20 
= house-to-house checks; BI> 20 = fogging (Sri Lanka).
3.2.4 Outbreak detection using the “epidemic channel”
Many countries use, in some way or another, the “endemic channel” for visualizing the expected case levels with the 
weekly (or monthly) average number of cases over the last five years and above a line which “traditionally” represents 
the arbitrary threshold value of +2 SD; others use the median and the third quartile (see Fig. 3). 
Fig. 3. Illustration of the seasonal variation of a vector-borne disease like dengue
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Source: authors’ calculations.
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The area between the lines of the mean and +2 SD is called “alert zone” or “alarm zone” and the area above the +2 SD 
line or third quartile line is called the “epidemic zone” showing the aberrations (Fig. 3). If the weekly number of dengue 
cases crosses the “historical” 2 SD line, then it is called an “outbreak”. Fig. 4 shows a dengue outbreak with the blue 
line of “weekly number of cases” crossing the +2 SD line several times between week one and 17 until the case numbers 
shoot up in week 18.
Fig. 4. Illustration of a dengue outbreak
Note: shows the number of new cases crossing the “historical” +2 SD line from week one to 17 several times before in week 18 the case numbers 
rise definitively.
Source: Ministry of Health, Dominican Republic, personal communication (2015).
According to experts at an international WHO meeting (Badurdeen et al. 2013), the following advantages of using the 
endemic channel for the outbreak definition were: (a) the “endemic channel” is a simple instrument and the crossing 
of the upper threshold line is easy to assess; (b) there is a standard definition of a dengue outbreak that can be used to 
inform the mass media and the public about the actual situation; (c) it is possible to determine the size of an outbreak 
in terms of duration, the total number of dengue cases, and the case fatality rate during the outbreak, thereby facilitating 
in-country and cross-country comparisons; and (d) it helps to assess the effect of response mechanisms and to define 
“stopping rules” (when the intensified response can be terminated).
Possible disadvantages of such a definition are: (a) programme managers may be tempted to use the crossing of the 
upper threshold line as a trigger for response to an outbreak rather than as an outbreak definition indicating that the 
outbreak is effectively already underway and thus initiate a delayed emergency response (see below); (b) the limited 
sensitivity and specificity of the definition – only 40% of such events when case numbers crossed the +2 SD threshold 
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were followed by a “massive” increase of cases in Puerto Rico (Rigau Perez et al. 1999a) and, using a similar predictor 
with a 1 SD threshold, Barbazan et al. (2002) found a sensitivity of 66%; (c) outbreaks in previous years can result in 
thresholds that are too high, however, no satisfactory algorithm for recognizing past aberrations has been devised (Far-
rington & Andrews, 2004) and consequently the values of “outbreak years” are usually not deleted from calculations 
of the historical (moving) average. 
3.2.5 The moving average or deviation bar chart
The seasonal increase of cases may come earlier than in the five preceding years giving the impression of an outbreak. 
This phenomenon has been handled by using the “deviation bar chart” (Rigau-Perez et al. 1999) or the “moving average” 
used for instance in Brazil and Malaysia12 (“moving median”); in this case, the average number of dengue cases across 
four weeks is compared with the average number of cases during a period of 12 weeks in the preceding five years (that 
is, the same four weeks as the actual observation period plus four weeks before and four weeks after the observation 
period) (Stroup et al. 1989). In Puerto Rico, the sensitivity of such a “deviation bar chart” for indicating a dengue outbreak 
was 40% and the specificity was 90% (Rigau-Perez et al. 1999). For practical reasons, it was suggested that it might be 
better to use the historical moving average to calculate the epidemiological week of observation plus six weeks before 
and six weeks after the week of observation, in total 13 weeks (Bowman et al. 2016b). When the geographical units are 
too small, the variation of cases increases and may show wide oscillations.
3.2.6 Other outbreak definitions
The ”incidence threshold” (that is, when the number of cases during a week passes a pre-defined threshold level, such as 
300 per 100 000 population, as used in Brazil), probably needs more research regarding advantages and disadvantages, 
and especially with respect to sensitivity and specificity. The definition of “two interconnected dengue cases” should be 
limited to non-endemic areas. However, such an event may be used to trigger routine operations (combined peri-focal 
interventions) in local areas. Clustering is used for local settings, for example, two dengue cases in 28 days in one village 
or neighbourhood (as used in Singapore) triggering interventions. 
Brady et al. (2015) modelled five different types of outbreak thresholds (recent mean, monthly mean, moving mean, 
cumulative mean and fixed incidence threshold) and, by doing so, identified highly heterogeneous outbreak character-
istics in terms of frequency, duration and case burden. All definitions identify outbreaks with characteristics that vary 
over time and space. Definitions differ in their timeliness of outbreak onset, and thus may be more or less suitable for 
early intervention. They vary widely in their capacity to enable effective preventative outbreak measures, such as early 
detection and early response, with the conclusion that preventative control may be more heavily reliant on early warning 
systems that predict outbreaks based on temporal anomalies in epidemiological and environmental warning signals. 
12 Numbers >2 SD “4-weekly average” above the mean of “three 4-weekly averages” in the five preceding years (“moving mean”, Brazil; in Malaysia the five-year moving 
median is used as alert at the state and national level).
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3.3 Alarm signals
An alarm signal is when the weekly case numbers enter the “alarm zone” (Fig. 4). In addition to the alarm signals based 
on “excess reporting” of cases, there are a variety of other potential alarm signals. They may either be thresholds based 
on syndromic surveillance systems or other indicators associated with high dengue transmission such as climatic indi-
cators.13 Specific alarm signals used in the low transmission season (“dry season”) may also trigger an early response.14 
Such alarm signals are considered to be important for triggering early response but they have to be validated before 
using them in a national programme. Additionally, the feasibility of applying such signals varies from country to country 
meaning that each country has to select the set of signals most useful for them. A WHO expert meeting proposed the 
candidate alarm signals15 summarized in Table 4. Also compare to Example 2 page 12.
13 Fan et al. (2014a) analysed systematically from 1589 identified articles 137 full text, with 33 satisfying inclusion criteria and found that the closest associations 
between dengue and temperature were observed between mean temperature from the included studies (23.2–27.7° C) and dengue fever (odds ratio – OR – 35.0% 
per 1 °C; 95% container index (CI) 18.3–51.6%) positively. Additionally, minimum (18.1–24.2 °C) (29.5% per 1 °C; 20.9–38.1%) and maximum temperature 
(28.0–34.5 °C) (28.9%; 10.3–47.5%) were also associated with increased dengue transmission. The OR of dengue fever (DF) incidence increased steeply from 22 °C 
to 29 °C, suggesting an inflexion of DF risk between these lower and upper limits of DF risk.
14 In Cambodia, reporting of dengue surpassing the threshold of 2 SD during the low season was predictive for an outbreak (2 SD above seasonal variation) 
during the following dengue season (Tourdjman, Huy & Vong, 2005).
15 Candidate indicators for predicting a dengue outbreak or for early outbreak detection through “syndromic surveillance” (Buehler et al. 2004) in order to trigger an 
early response have been proposed. However, a literature review (Runge-Ranzinger et al. 2008) found that there were no systematic analyses or validations of these 
putative indicators or of their operational reliability and cost-effectiveness.  
Retrospective studies, particularly from Singapore, suggested that a serotype or even genotype shift is associated with increased dengue transmission, often 
with a lag time of around six months. A serotype switch from DENV-2 to DENV-1 in 2004/2005 was associated with the 2005 epidemic (Lee et al. 2010; Koh et al. 
2008). According to Schreiber et al (2009), viral genome sequencing would not have been sufficient to predict this outbreak. A switch from DENV-1 back to DENV-
2 in early 2007 was used as a warning sign and led to response actions, which were perceived to reduce the impact of the outbreak six months later in 2007/2008. 
A clade replacement within DENV-2 was also discussed as a contributing factor to the 2007 outbreak (Lee et al. 2010) and was involved in a larger outbreak at the 
end of 2010 (Lee et al. 2012). However, the studies did not include negative controls and it may have been a site-specific event, depending on the herd immunity, 
population size, co-circulation of dengue viruses and other factors. Only countries with serotype/genotype-specific surveillance will be able to follow up their 
pattern.  
Three surveys in Surabaya/Indonesia investigated prospectively the correlation of DENV type and disease incidence. An increase in case numbers in 2010 was 
attributed to a genotype shift in DENV-1 from genotype DENV-4 to DENV-1, which took place between April and September 2009 (Yamanaka et al. 2011). 
Retrospective analysis of serotype-specific surveillance data in the Pacific region (Li et al. 2010) demonstrated that the rapid replacement of DENV-1 by DENV-4 in 
the region was associated with dengue outbreaks in 2008 and 2009 in Kiribati, New Caledonia, Samoa, Tonga and other islands. The appearance of a new serotype 
as a warning sign is described in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (De Simone et al. 2004), Bolivia (Pirard et al. 1997), Grenada (Schiøler, 2006), Puerto Rico (Rigau-Pérez et al. 
2002) and Viet Nam (Tien et al. 1999).  
In Bolivia, a dengue serotype 2 (DENV-2) outbreak occurred at the same time as DENV-2 was detected as a newly introduced virus (Pirard et al. 1997). In Grenada, 
an epidemic occurred with a two-month delay after the index case with a new serotype (Schiøler 2006). In Brazil, the first autochthonous DEN-3 transmission was 
detected in December 2000, but the outbreak in 2001 was due to DENV-1⁄DENV-2 and the expected DENV-3 epidemic started only in 2002 with a delay of almost 
two years (De Simone et al. 2004). In Viet Nam, DENV-3, which was first detected in 1994, spread gradually and led to an epidemic in 1998. In Puerto Rico, virus 
surveillance revealed an unexpected paradox: the 1998 epidemic after DENV-3 introduction was predominantly due to DENV-1⁄DENV-4, while DENV-3 took over in 
1999 but without causing an outbreak. Rigau-Pérez et al. (2002) also described a change of predominant serotype, or the introduction of a new one. 
Virus isolation rate as a percentage of positive blood samples in the low season based on routine virological tests was a predictor of dengue outbreaks in Puerto 
Rico (Rigau-Pèrez et al. 2001) and Viet Nam (Tien et al. 1999). One study from Singapore mentioned that, during the 2007/2008 epidemic, the proportion of DENV 
positive samples detected by PCR rose from 57.9% in January 2007 to 91.0% in July 2007 at the peak of transmission (Lee et al. 2010). This had also been observed 
in Puerto Rico (Rigau-Pérez & Clark, 2005). 
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Table 4. Proposed candidate alarm signals (triggers for early response)  
Trigger
Evidence or expert 
opinion
Evidence from 
the literature
Feasibility
Further 
research 
needed
New predominant serotype introduced +++ ++ Most countries +++
Changes in age group distribution ++ + Most countries +++
Increased number of hospitalized/
outpatient fever cases/probable 
dengue* (threshold)
+++ ++++ Most countries +++
Increase in vector presence ++ + Most countries +++
Increase in news reporting 
dengue outbreaks, social network 
comments
+
++
Few countries ++++
Climate changes: increase in rainfall/
temperature/humidity
++
++
Most countries +++
Increase in % positive serology* ++++ ++++ Most countries ++
Increase internal displacement/
population mobility
+
+
Context dependent ++++
Cluster identified through GIS 
mapping
++
+++
Few countries +++
Identification of outbreak in a 
neighbouring geographical unit 
(state, district, province, country)*
++++ ++++ Most countries ++
GIS: geographic information system; *Particularly useful indicators/triggers.
Source: WHO/TDR expert meeting recommendations (2012).
Syndromic surveillance may contribute important alarm signals for early dengue outbreaks (see Chapter 2). These 
include: level of school absenteeism; volume of Internet-based health inquiries; malaria negative rate in fever patients; 
non-specific laboratory requests as malaria negativity rates or as thrombocytes requested; and fever alerts or clinical 
syndromic definitions.
Other approaches such as the use of socioeconomic indicators for risk assessment or environmental parameters as well as 
modelling tools are being discussed; however they are either very site-specific or not yet sufficiently developed. However 
they may play a relevant role in the identification and prioritization of the ‘risk areas’ within a geographical area in order 
to specify where interventions need to be focused after an alert is given.
In order to clearly link increased dengue transmission as predicted by defined alarm signals to the required response, it 
is crucial to define the level of transmission at which a specific response should be started. A WHO expert meeting in 
2012 suggested the triggers for early or late response (Baburdeen et al. 2013) as presented below:
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3.3.1 Staged alerts/outbreak alarms
Small-scale interventions or preparedness activities have to be put in place prior to a full outbreak (see Fig. 5).
If case numbers rise above a pre-defined threshold and/or the alarm signals and/or integrated alert algorithm is positive, 
some action has to be taken (initial, early or late response, see Chapter 4). 
Control measures come too late when they are implemented at the start of an outbreak (“late or emergency re-
sponse”, see Brookmeyer & Stroup, 2004). It is therefore recommended to react in a timely and structured way 
when the alarm signals indicate the threat of a dengue outbreak e.g. by using a staged response scheme. The 
combination of these signals may vary between countries and also depends on the availability of resources. 
 The real difficulty lies in “…setting up appropriate protocols for deciding which signals to investigate and which to ignore 
 and for communicating effectively the role and limitations of automated systems” (Farrington & Andrews, 2004). 
An example of a comprehensive surveillance system is given in Fig. 5. 
3.3.2 A new evidence-based model of outbreak alert  
A retrospective analysis of five countries in Asia and Latin America demonstrated that it was possible to sensitively 
detect outbreaks with a low false alarm rate using a combination of the Shewhart method to define alarm signals, and 
the endemic channel to define outbreaks. 
Outbreaks were defined when incident dengue cases were above 1.25 times the SD of the moving mean for two con-
secutive weeks, and ended when incidence was below the SD for two consecutive weeks. Alarms were triggered after 
two or more observations in the explanatory variable were above a threshold within a period of one to 12 weeks prior 
to the outbreak. This threshold was calculated using the outcome of logistic regression analyses between explanatory 
and response variables among the historic dataset. 
An increase in probable cases was indicative of outbreaks, while meteorological variables, particularly mean tempera-
ture, demonstrated predictive potential in some countries, but not all. Notably, some of the highest metrics were across 
Mexico and the Dominican Republic, where an increase in probable cases predicted outbreaks (incident hospitalized 
cases) with sensitivities and PPV of 93%/83% and 97%/86%, respectively, at a lag of one to 12 weeks. Also, an increase 
in mean temperature predicted outbreaks (incident hospitalized cases) in Mexico and Brazil, with sensitivities and PPVs 
of 79%/73% and 81%/46%, respectively, again at a lag of one to 12 weeks (Bowman et al. 2016b). Additional indicators 
such as rainfall and mean relative humidity also showed promise, but were inconsistent across the countries.
In summary, incident-probable dengue cases could be used in early warning systems to highlight the onset of dengue 
outbreaks, while meteorological variables may be used to indicate an increased risk of epidemic dengue transmission. 
This mirrors findings reported elsewhere (Hii et al. 2009; 2012). However, further research is needed at increasingly 
granular scales to capture the finer dengue transmission dynamics that exist across neighbourhoods and smaller urban/
rural areas (Bowman et al. 2016b). In addition, improved outbreak definitions that focus on the earliest phase of inci-
dence, when interventions are likely to have a greater impact on transmission, should be a priority.
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Fig. 5. Outbreak indicators potentially triggering Interventions 
Source: adapted from Harrington et al. (2013).
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3.4 Outbreak investigation
Elements of outbreak investigations (see also Hills et al, 2002) are presented in Checklist 4 and should be considered 
in the contingency plan.
CHECKLIST 4. OUTBREAK INVESTIGATION
1. Specific stakeholders responsible for investigating the outbreak (see list of possible stakeholders, Chapter 4.6, 
Table 6) 
2. Description of the risk assessment scheme
3. Preparation of technical equipment
4. Designated person(s) to carry out the outbreak investigation
5. Interview with the index case, or alternative method of establishing clinical and epidemiological details 
6. Analysis of epidemiological data, epidemic channel 
7. Active case finding strategies to confirm local transmission and assess size of the event 
3.5 Outbreak declaration and risk communication 
Once an outbreak has been detected by applying a set of pre-defined criteria fulfilling the outbreak definition (for ex-
ample, case numbers cross the 2 SD line), it should be declared in order to make stakeholders and the general public 
aware of the epidemic. Risk communication is a fundamental element of managing an emergency public health threat to 
encourage positive behavioural change and maintain public trust (WHO 2010). However, outbreaks are highly charged 
political and social events whereby “outbreak declaration and transparency from expert to audience is surrounded by 
political and economic overtones, often bogged down with questions of blame which may be critical in a fractious 
political system” (Abraham, 2011). In order to avoid politically biased decision-making, an institutional, automated or 
algorithm-based system for verification and declaration of an epidemic is of importance.
Checklist 5 summarizes elements of the contingency plan for risk communication and Fig. 5 the outbreak indicators 
potentially triggering interventions.
CHECKLIST 5. RISK COMMUNICATION
1. Who is the responsible technical person with the mandate to declare the outbreak? Who is the official 
spokesperson?
2. Method and interval timing for informing clinicians/health workers should be specified 
3. Method and timing for informing the public of an outbreak should be specified
4. How to work cooperatively with the media?
5. The risk communication methods and channels should be determined based upon the urgency of the 
communication (risk or crisis communication), resources and trusted national/ local communication channels
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4.1 Characteristics of a dengue outbreak
The term ‘“outbreak’” (used synonymously with “epidemic”) is defined as a ‘“sudden unexpected increase of cases’” 
or as “the occurrence in a community or region of cases of an illness clearly in excess of expectancy” (Heymann et al. 
2004). Such a “sudden and unexpected increase” (outbreak) is different from the seasonal peak, which is an “expected 
increase in cases” that usually occurs during or immediately after the wet season (see Chapter 3). In an analysis of den-
gue outbreaks in 10 countries, it was found that the average duration of a dengue outbreak at provincial, regional and 
state levels was recorded as 10 months (range five to 13 months) and the average number of cases was 26 732 (range 
12 171 to 69 680 cases) (Badurdeen et al. 2013). A more detailed analysis in Brazil showed that the average incidence 
rate of dengue cases during outbreaks was 538 per 100 000 population (Teixeira et al. 2013). 
4.2 Staged response
Staged response means that response activities are initiated according to the level of alert (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6. Illustration of the different phases in the development of a dengue outbreak and different levels of 
response 
Source: Badurdeen et al. (2013).
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4.2.1 Example of trigger signals for response activities
The following initial/early/late alarm signals are applied in the above-mentioned retrospective study (Bowman et al. 
2016b) and are currently being tested in a prospective study. 
Initial response 
•	 One alarm indicator with one alarm signal (that is, one observation above the alarm threshold) for two weeks.
•	 Two or more indicators with one alarm signal where a maximum of one indicator has two alarm signals, for example, 
temperature one alarm signal (positive for one week), probable cases, two alarm signals (positive for two weeks), OR 
temperature, rainfall and probable cases with one positive signal each.
Early response
•	 A single alarm indicator has three alarm signals.
•	 Two or more alarm indicators with presence of alarm signals for two or more weeks.
•	 When dengue case numbers cross the z* SD threshold. 
Late response (= emergency response) 
Response is initiated when the outbreak has started, that is, when case numbers are above z* SD for three weeks (note: 
the need for an emergency response would be further reinforced if alarm signals had been present before the start of 
the outbreak). 
 
Fig. 7. Illustration of how alarms are captured triggering the staged response system
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4.2.2 Example of staged response activities 
The following sets of interventions at the three different outbreak response levels were selected by the study countries 
according to their national context, and summarized here as an example. 
Initial response
•	 Conduct thorough outbreak investigation.
•	 Ensure contingency plan is ready  (including specification on how to inform, what exactly needs to be done and who 
is responsible for each activity), as well as the application of existing vector control guidelines.
•	 Update the necessary background information (cartography, demographics, etc.).
•	 Convene Dengue Task Force and trigger the Health Promotion and Communications team to make sure outbreak 
messages and materials are ready (for example, radio/TV spots, messages for release via social media, pamphlets, 
posters, school-based activities, workplace-based activities, etc.) for the implementation of risk communication and 
dengue risk-reduction activities. 
•	 Prioritize risk area for interventions informed by: (a) current epidemiological metrics; (b) high-risk locations such as 
cemeteries and construction sites; and (c) areas that experienced recurrent or recent outbreaks.
•	 Ensure human, financial and logistic resources.
•	 Convene local dengue committees.
•	 Enhance surveillance by activation of syndromic surveillance, sentinel sites or active components and scale-up lab-
oratory confirmation.
•	 Enhance other routine activities, such as vector control and alerts for hospitals. 
Early response
•	 Declare and communicate the risk: the Dengue Task Force in collaboration with the Health Promotion and Com-
munication team will ensure communication of consistent risk messages to national, regional and local authorities, 
public and private health systems (hospitals, clinics, providers, laboratories, pharmacies), local dengue committees, 
and the private sector (safety officers at construction sites, factories, office buildings, etc.).
•	 Activate established communication channels to the appropriate sectors – public health, clinical care, education 
system, media, the public, and the national and international authorities.
•	 Ensure training of relevant workforce, if still not done.
•	 Implement community-level risk communication and dengue risk-reduction activities (for example, reduce mosquito 
breeding potential of water-holding containers, eliminate items not in use) in priority areas through community outreach 
teams, vector control field staff, local, municipal, regional health staff, private health providers in the priority areas.
•	 Implement communications outreach and dengue risk-reduction activities to schools and businesses in the priority areas.
•	 Intensify vector control by source reduction and fogging activities in prioritized high-risk areas (as defined above 
in Initial response) while ensuring quality of interventions (ideally impact assessment) and community support 
(messages should be disseminated to residents with clear steps on how to collaborate with fogging activities: leave 
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windows and doors open during fogging actions; close the house once the fogging has been completed; and do not 
enter the house for two to four hours after fogging).
•	 Identify high-risk areas for intervention by environmental, socioeconomic indicators or by GIS.
•	 Prepare dengue treatment areas in major hospitals and in high-risk areas (see below).
•	 Cease intervention activities after two negative alarm signals while conducting impact assessment by surveillance of 
vector population.
•	 Management of health services: (a) national/provincial/district steering committees; (b) circulate Hospital Dengue 
Preparedness and Contingency plans which should include plans for the mobilization of doctors/nurses within the 
region and from other specialties, and for surges in bed requirements.
•	 Alert hospitals and health centres: (a) distribute guidelines for case detection and treatment; (b) alert an outbreak 
management team; and (c) disseminate information about the end of the alert.
Early response in clinical settings
•	 Alert the outbreak management team; alert hospitals and health centres, district officer and distribute guidelines for 
case detection and treatment.
•	 Provide information developed by the Dengue Task Force Communications team. 
•	 Prepare dengue treatment areas in major hospitals and high-risk areas.
•	 Engage the private health sector, including clinics, outpatient ambulatory offices, hospitals, pharmacies, and laboratories.
•	 Install and staff the Dengue Operations Centre/Dengue Command Centre/Dengue Situation Room (seven days a week).
4.2.3 Emergency response (or late response) after the outbreak has started
•	 Declare and communicate the urgency of the outbreak: The Dengue Task Force in collaboration with the Health 
Promotion and Communication team will ensure communication of consistent risk and crisis messages, should the 
ongoing outbreak warrant declaration of a crisis to national, regional and local authorities, public and private health 
systems (hospitals, clinics, providers, laboratories, pharmacies), local dengue committees, and the private sector 
(safety officers at construction sites, factories, office buildings, etc.). Full implementation of the contingency plan in 
collaboration with key partners such as Security Council, Ministries of Education and public works, local authorities, 
municipal sanitation services, representatives from the private sector and the media, and nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs), among others. 
•	 Maintain all activities described in the Early Response checklist while increasing the intensity and geographical scale 
of the vector control actions. Hence, where positive dengue cases are confirmed, the vector control response should 
be delivered throughout the entire district.
•	 Implement outreach and dengue risk reduction activities with schools, businesses and markets in the expanded 
geographical areas.
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•	 Sustain response measures until the outbreak has been officially declared ended (that is, case numbers have been 
below the z* SD threshold for three weeks). If activities are terminated too early, the outbreak may simply be shifted 
to a later date, but if the measures are stopped too late, resources may be wasted.
4.3 Elements of a successful outbreak response
Following a systematic literature review (Pilger et al. 2010), the elements of a successful outbreak response were extracted 
and are presented in Table 5. Further details of good practices leading to an adequate response are given in Fig. 8. They 
will be presented in the following sections.
Table 5. Elements of a successful outbreak response  
I. Management of outbreak  
response
•	 Organization	of	multidisciplinary	response	teams
•	 Incorporation	of	public	organizations	in	multidisciplinary	response	
teams
•	 Use	of	mass	media,	print	and	interpersonal	communication	to	
update the public on the outbreak, reassure the community that 
actions are being taken, and encourage public participation in 
dengue risk-reduction activities 
•	 M&E	of	all	control	activities
II. Management of vector control 
services
•	 Organization of “search and destroy” teams
•	 Incorporation of communities in vector control activities
•	 Systematic geographical coverage of activities
•	 Collection of data on cases to enhance surveillance
•	 Education of households on the elimination and control of 
mosquito breeding sites and importance of neighbourhood 
fogging 
III. Management of health services
•	 Training of hospital personnel in rapid diagnosis and correct 
treatment
•	 Training of laboratory personnel
•	 Provide adequate supplies for laboratory analysis and case 
management
•	 Use of mass media, print and interpersonal communication 
to inform the community of appropriate health-care seeking, 
including immediate care in the presence of the dengue 
warning signs
•	 Use of mosquito nets in hospitals to reduce transmission
•	 Establishment of case report conferences
Source: Pilger et al. (2010).
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Fig. 8. Different elements of good practices leading to effective outbreak management
35
T
R
A
IN
IN
G
 M
A
N
U
A
L
Technical handbook for dengue surveillance, dengue outbreak prediction/detection and outbreak response
4.4 Health system and management aspects
The contingency plan should briefly summarize the structure of the health system defining stakeholder involvement in 
dengue prevention and control activities as below:
•	 the landscape of stakeholders;
•	 the political level that will coordinate the outbreak response;
•	 the roles, responsibilities and communication pathways of:
 - public health sector
 - entomologists and assistants
 - environment sector (waste disposal unit/urban development sector/water services)
 - private health sector
 - NGOs, civil society and other organizations (including religious groups) 
 - education sector
 - any other relevant sectors of the locality  (sports groups, youth clubs, etc.).
Specifically, an Outbreak Response Team/Action Committee should be established at the national (for example Dengue 
Task Force) and local level. Possible members are presented in Table 6.
The description of the teams and their tasks includes: 
•	 defining team members; 
•	 defining the objectives of the team;
•	 define the roles of each member of the team;
•	 setting out when and how often the team should meet to discuss and monitor the outbreak response;
•	 describing how the team will communicate during inter-epidemic and outbreak phases;
•	 ensuring information links with neighbouring countries (for national team), and neighbouring districts (for local 
team) for early outbreak detection.
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It is important to guarantee intersectoral compliance with a regulatory framework in terms of financial and operational 
participation after a thorough capacity analysis. The focus on ‘what’ should be implemented and ‘who’ should do it is 
crucial.  Functional details of the roles of stakeholders in relation to their capacity (for example, NGOs, civil society and 
the education sector) should be defined and updated.
The contingency plan should include information on M&E of the outbreak preparedness and response activities. This 
should include a matrix for the different elements to be monitored. 
It is important to assess the additional human resources that will be required in a dengue outbreak, both in clinical 
management of cases and vector control. This includes redistribution of staff, scaling up of existing staff and extension 
of shifts (Barbosa da Silva et al, 2002; Badurdeen et al. 2013). Overwork and subsequent demotivation of health staff 
has been identified as a problem, such as increased demands by politicians and the community (Horstick et al. 2010). 
Therefore, staff training for an outbreak in the inter-epidemic period and supportive supervision during the epidemic 
can help staff cope with excessive challenges during the epidemic (Pilger et al. 2010). Investment in human resources 
training must be made prior to the outbreak and the outbreak response plan requires a section that documents all the 
activities to be performed in the inter-epidemic period in preparation for an outbreak, particularly related to outbreak 
preparedness as opposed to preventative control (see Chapter 3). The contingency plan should also include the “stopping 
rules”, that is, when and how to stop the outbreak response and continue with routine interventions.
Actions be considered for organization and management of the outbreak response is summarized below in Checklist 6.
CHECKLIST 6. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
1. Identify who is responsible for organizing the actions, when and for how long should they be performed (“stopping 
rule”)
2. Establish the M&E process at all levels (national, regional, local)
3. Determine staffing levels required for full vector control coverage and social mobilization
4. Define details of logistic/operational considerations of chemical mosquito control
5. State the role of the community, government teams and NGOs in vector control actions, and how to map and 
prioritize the risk area that needs to be covered 
6. Mobilize the community to prompt appropriate health-care seeking behaviours, in particular regarding the dengue 
warning signs, and to participate in vector control activities e.g. fogging activities by opening the doors and 
windows of their homes, and to promote the destruction or proper management of mosquito breeding sites 
according to the national policy
7. Encourage strong local-level involvement 
8. Identify individuals who are responsible for training at all levels (municipality, state, local authority, hospital, etc).
9. Train staff on their roles and responsibilities prior to an epidemic, with short, targeted training during an epidemic 
when necessary
10. Recruit additional staff during the outbreak, for example, from other geographical areas or systems
11. Maintain an emergency staff roster
12. Engage members of civil society, volunteers and the private sector
13. Mobilize resources and financial management
14. Create the appropriate legal framework for your activities
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4.5 Vector management
Dengue prevention and outbreak mitigation still rely on vector control. Many approaches and tools are available to pur-
sue this goal, and the likelihood of each method being successful depends on numerous factors, such as frequency of 
treatment, the geographical area treated and coverage, and the likelihood that communities within the target population 
will accept and adopt it. In some cases, the potential for success will be limited by the inherent properties of the method 
itself, while the potential for others may differ according to social or geographical contexts. Virtually all approaches 
should be considered within an integrated pest management programme. Many methods have been used frequently in 
dengue endemic localities worldwide and a number of recent reviews have evaluated the evidence for their effectiveness. 
In the examples below, the main results of the systematic literature reviews analysing specific interventions are presented 
initially, followed by systematic reviews (SR) analysing all interventions in a comparative analysis, SRs looking at specific 
services related to outbreak interventions, and finally SRs looking at vector control services in general. Clear conclusions 
are rarely possible, as the quality and comparability of available literature is quite limited.
4.5.1 Control of dengue vectors with insecticides
Insecticidal space spraying/fogging for adult mosquito control
Peridomestic space spraying, using different insecticides, is one of the most commonly used dengue vector control 
methods. The systematic review by Esu et al. (2010) included 15 studies of which 13 showed reductions in immature 
entomological indices that were not sustained for long periods. The remainder showed space spray interventions to be 
ineffective at reducing adult and/or immature entomological indices. Only one study measured human disease indi-
cators, but its outcomes could not be directly attributed to space sprays alone. Although peridomestic space spraying 
is commonly applied by national dengue control programmes, there are very few studies evaluating the effectiveness 
of this intervention and there is no clear evidence for recommending peridomestic space spraying as a single effective 
control intervention. 
Control of immature mosquito stages with insecticides (larvicides) 
Temephos
The systematic literature review by George et al. (2015) assessed the community effectiveness of the organophosphate 
temephos (or Abate®) in controlling both vectors and dengue transmission when delivered either as a single intervention 
or in combination with other interventions. A total of 27 studies were included, comprising 11 single and 16 combined 
intervention studies. All single intervention studies showed consistently that temephos applications reduced entomo-
logical indices. Although 11 of the 16 combined intervention studies showed that temephos application together with 
other chemical vector control methods also reduced entomological indices, this was either not sustained over time or 
failed to reduce immature stages. Temephos alone was effective at suppressing entomological indices, but not when it 
was applied in combination with other interventions. There is no evidence to suggest that temephos use is associated 
with reductions in dengue transmission.
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Bacillus thuringiensis israelensis (Bti)
Fourteen studies were included in a systematic review of the biological insecticide Bti of which 12 reported a reduction 
in entomological indices for an average control duration of two to four weeks (Boyce et al. 2013). Bti can be effective in 
reducing the number of immature Aedes in treated containers but there is very limited evidence (one study) that dengue 
morbidity can be reduced through the use of Bti alone. Hence, there is currently insufficient evidence to recommend 
its use as a single agent for the long-term control of dengue vectors and prevention of DF. 
4.5.2 Biological control of dengue vectors 
Predatory copepods
A systematic review of the use of copepods (microscopic predatory crustaceans) identified 11 articles, focusing on 
efficacy and community effectiveness (Lazaro et al. 2015). There was limited evidence from Viet Nam that Mesocyclops 
spp. had the potential to impact on vector populations in the long term, contributing to reductions in dengue cases. 
However, this success has not yet been replicated elsewhere (six further studies). With this limited evidence for the use 
of copepods as a single intervention, further implementation studies in other communities/environments are needed. 
Larvivorous fish
Han et al. (2015) reviewed the evidence for effectiveness of larvivorous fish for Aedes control and dengue prevention. The 
13 articles identified incorporated a wide range of interventions and outcome measures, with three efficacy studies, 10 
of which assessed community effectiveness. None were randomized or cluster-randomized controlled trials. All efficacy 
studies reported that Aedes larvae were eliminated from treated containers, while community effectiveness studies re-
ported reductions in immature vector stages, two of which also detected a continuous decline over two years. An impact 
on adult mosquitoes was shown in only two community effectiveness studies. Reductions in dengue cases following 
intervention were not proven. While the use of larvivorous fish as a single agent or in combination with other control 
measures could lead to reductions in immature vector stages, considerable limitations in all the studies restricted any 
conclusions with respect to the evaluation of community effectiveness. 
4.5.3 Systematic reviews and meta-analysis of all methods and approaches for dengue 
prevention and control
Bowman et al. (2016a) reviewed the available evidence for all methods in a more quantitative approach. Restricting 
their search to studies published after 1980 (that is, in the era of the modern mega-city, high levels of global trade and 
passenger travel, the presence of all four dengue viruses in all regions, and the emergence of insecticide resistance), they 
included 41 studies, 19 of which provided sufficient data for meta-analyses. All studies presented vector index data, 
but only 18 studies reported an impact on dengue incidence. In general, the overall number of studies was low, and the 
power of those included was limited by weaker study designs: for example, none of the reports that investigated the 
impact of vector control on dengue incidence were randomized controlled studies (RCTs). No randomized controlled 
trials have been undertaken anywhere in the past 35 years to evaluate the effectiveness of space-spraying or fogging 
to reduce dengue transmission or dengue incidence, despite its widespread use. On a more positive note, limited but 
significant evidence indicated that house screening could have an impact on vector indices and reduce dengue transmis-
sion. Regarding the impact on vectors, there was some evidence to support the use of combination community-based 
campaigns (clean-up campaigns, refuse collection) to reduce vector abundance, although there is no evidence for an 
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impact on transmission (Bowman et al. 2016a). Subsequently, evidence of both an impact on vector abundance and 
dengue transmission was reported (Andersson et al., 2015). Further research in this area is merited.  Insecticide-treated 
materials may confer protection but only when coverage is high and in communities where house structure is suitable. 
There was some evidence to suggest that indoor residual spraying (IRS) does not have a significant impact on dengue 
transmission, although further research is needed due to the low number of studies.
Horstick and Runge-Ranzinger (2016) analyzed household based vector interventions focusing on four vector borne 
diseases including RCTs and cRCTs only. For dengue this systematic review included 12 studies: one cluster-randomised 
intervention trial, one parallel group cRCT, one cluster randomised community trial and 9 cRCTs. For dengue, single 
interventions if correctly delivered, could impact on the vector but not on transmission, although results were likely 
to have been compromised by weak study designs. The use of ITMs (curtains/screens) could impact (good evidence) 
on the vector depending on the suitability of the housing structure. Environmental management including clean-up 
campaigns, has a weak effect (not consistent, good evidence), including India and Nicaragua. No studies assessing the 
use of insecticides for peridomestic/space spraying were identified.  Measuring human transmission remains scarce, only 
two studies showed a reduction (Andersson et al. 2015 and Kroeger et al. 2006).
Insecticide-treated materials
In cluster randomized control trials (cRCTs) in Mexico and Venezuela (Kroeger et al. 2006), ITMs (specifically insecti-
cide-treated curtains or ITCs) were found to impact on vector populations.  This was not the case in Thailand, where the 
open character of local housing cancelled out any impact (Lenhart et al. 2013). A cRCT in Mexico using permanently 
mounted, insecticide-treated netting screens fitted to the doors and windows of residential houses, followed in a second 
year by additional larviciding with Spinosad, demonstrated a rapid and sustained impact on the vector population for 
over 12 months (Che-Mendoza et al. 2015; Manrique-Saide et al., 2015). A cRCT in Colombia (Quintero et al. 2015) 
also reported impacts on the vector population by long-lasting insecticide-treated netting used as window and door 
curtains, both alone or in combination with insecticide-treated netting water container covers.  Impacts of ITMs on 
dengue transmission have not yet been reported.
Biological and environmental methods
In Thailand, no significant impacts were reported in a cRCT (Kittayapong et al. 2012) using a combination of Mesocyclops 
aspericornis (copepods), Bacillus thuringiensis var. israelensis toxins (Bti sacs), screen net covers (MosNet®) for water 
jars, mosquito traps (MosHouse®), and portable vacuum aspirators (MosCatch™). Since then, a cRCT in Nicaragua 
(Andersson et al. 2015) tested a combination of environmental management and reported evidence of both an impact 
on vector abundance and dengue transmission.
Environmental methods only (not including the mode of delivery of an intervention, but the intervention itself)
An assessment of waste management as a single intervention in a cRCT in Sri Lanka (Abeyewickreme et al. 2012) reported 
a reduction in pupal indices. A cRCT in India (Arunchalam et al. 2012) established the effectiveness of a combination 
of water container covers, clean-up campaigns, including community mobilization. In a cRCT in Brazil (Caprara et al. 
2015), a combination of a clean-up campaign, the use of container covers, and community mobilization failed to have 
a substantial effect.
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4.5.4 Systematic review for a service-oriented purpose
For interventions focusing on a particular service delivery in the context of vector control, there is existing work on 
outbreak response (Pilger et al. 2010). In total, 24 studies showed different strategies in the organization of outbreak 
response emphasizing an intersectoral approach. Studies that managed the outbreak response by creating multidisciplinary 
response teams, including vector control teams working door-to-door, and studies that monitored and evaluated their 
activities, all achieved successful outbreak control. A combination of vector control (the elimination of larval habitats 
with community involvement, and the appropriate use of insecticides in and around houses), and training for medical 
personnel with laboratory support, was crucial for the successful control of outbreaks. Spatial spraying of insecticides 
alone proved ineffective in achieving outbreak control and its usefulness in combination with other interventions was 
unconvincing. The available evidence suggested that, in order to achieve rapid control, the outbreak response must 
employ a multidisciplinary approach combined with M&E. 
4.5.5 Systematic review of the organizational context of vector control
A systematic review of vector control service delivery highlighted many shortcomings globally (Horstick et al. 2010). 
Three out of nine studies on vector control services showed that there was little change in control operations over 
time, though there were attempts at strategic changes via decentralization and intersectoral collaboration. Staffing 
levels, appropriate capacity building, management and organization, sustained funding and mechanisms for achieving 
community engagement were inadequate and were key problem areas. Case studies in four countries confirmed most 
of the information gleaned from the systematic review. Key public health stakeholders’ doubts about the effectiveness 
of services in reducing vector densities and significantly reducing virus transmission were widespread, although they 
believed that, given the availability of resources, interventions could be effective. The reviewers stressed the need for: 
(i) the development of operational standards for vector control services, including minimum financial and personnel 
requirements relative to the geographical area(s) to be covered, their demography, and the vector control methods to 
be implemented; (ii) evidence-based selection and delivery of different interventions or combinations of interventions, 
adapted to different settings; (iii) the development and application of M&E tools for vector control service delivery; and 
(iv) needs-driven capacity building, especially in public health, entomology and communication.
After considering the limitations of the systematic reviews described above the following practical recommendations 
emerged (see also Checklist 7).
•	 Vector control has the potential to be effective, although implementation remains an issue. No clear evidence exists 
for a recommended structure for vector control delivery services.
•	 At present, a lack of evidence prevents decisions about which interventions are most effective, particularly for re-
sponding to dengue outbreaks. The likelihood of success of any method depends on numerous factors including 
the frequency of treatment, the geographical area to be treated, the coverage to be achieved and the probability of its 
acceptance and adoption by communities within the target population. In order for the method to be effective and 
acceptable to communities, careful implementation of measures may be as or more important than the actual choice 
of the combinations of vector control methods.
•	 A key element in delivering effective vector control measures is likely to be timely alerts of outbreaks, as provided 
by surveillance systems, followed by immediate and frequent vector control measures and allied health promotional 
campaigns.
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•	 There is an urgent need for the development of standards to estimate vector population sizes accurately, for use in 
evalu-ating interventions under trial conditions, as well as for routine use in surveillance.
•	 Where feasible, dengue vector control studies should endeavour to include some measure of dengue transmission 
as ultimate proof of efficacy and community effectiveness. 
CHECKLIST 7. VECTOR MANAGEMENT FOR OUTBREAK CONTROL
1. Determine the quantity (number of houses treated, coverage, treatment frequency) of insecticide, equipment, 
personnel required, particularly for ultra-low volume (ULV), outdoor spraying and indoor spraying, and develop 
relevant SOPs
2. Repeat these procedures as they apply to larval control (chemical and biological control)
3. Conduct insecticide susceptibility assays frequently to ensure that insecticides being used remain effective 
4. Conduct vector surveys in the inter-epidemic period. In addition to immature stage/breeding sites, pupal data are 
critical in identifying productive container types for targeted interventions during the outbreak. Adult mosquito data 
are the most accurate indices
5. Ensure resources required for next level responses are available, and are functional and prepared for action (that is, 
insecticide, spray and other equipment, skilled personnel)
6. State details of how larval control will be deployed – SOPs
7. Describe the SOPs for vector-control services, including minimum financial and personnel requirements (in 
accordance with the geographical area to be covered) 
8. Select and describe different vector-control interventions adapted to different settings or productive container 
types.
9. Customize dengue mosquito control programmes in schools, hospitals, etc.
10. Develop and apply M&E tools for vector control. Continue to conduct vector surveys throughout the year in order 
to detect rises in vector populations and to evaluate the impact of vector control (particularly important during 
outbreaks)
11. Ensure that a vector control plan of action is in place16
12. If any planned vector control tools or strategies have not previously (or recently) been used in the targeted 
community, ensure advanced warning and education is provided to optimize correct usage and compliance  
13. For existing strategies, ongoing promotion and education should be continued (and reviewed at frequent intervals)
14. Target breeding sites of immature mosquito stages, particularly the productive containers, aiming to reduce the 
number of potential sites (eliminating, covering or larviciding containers), and deliver an impact on the adult vector 
population, approximately 2–3 weeks later
15. Promote house screens, advocate clean-up campaigns 
16.  Ensure risk reduction messages are communicated in a timely fashion and that the messages reflect the status of 
the outbreak
17. Inform communities what will NOT be effective (buzzers, grass cutting, etc.)
16 http://www.who.int/whopes/resistance/en/ (accessed 11 March 2016).
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4.6 Stakeholder involvement 
Control activities for a dengue outbreak need to be multisectoral, multi-disciplinary and multi-level. They require en-
vironmental, political, social and medical input to be coordinated so that the successful activities of one sector are not 
weakened by the lack of commitment of another (Pilger et al. 2010).
It has been argued that effective communication between stakeholders at all levels of surveillance, clinical management and 
transmission control is paramount, as the chain of events is only as strong as its weakest link (Ng et al. 2011). In order to 
coordinate an effective response, it is crucial to document the relevant stakeholders involved in an outbreak response at 
both local level with regards to implementation, and at higher political levels with regards to decision-making (Table 6).
Table 6. Example of stakeholders with or without to the Outbreak Response Team
Stakeholders Responsibilities (examples)
Ministry of health Usually the coordinating body. Vector control services, 
clinical services, communication and health promotion 
(social mobilization), national public health laboratory
Ministry of education Involvement of schools, social mobilization
Youth and women’s affairs Social mobilization
Sanitation and environment sector Guarantee water supply, solid waste management
Construction sector Keep construction sites water and container free
NGOs Social mobilization
Private medical sector Case reporting, apply measures in private clinics and 
premises
Civil society Social mobilization
Media Information policy through defined spokespersons
Outbreak response team As defined, see Table 6
Entomologists Determine vector resistance, analyse entomological 
indices and issue recommendations
Epidemiologists Analyse clinical data, assess case fatality rate, analyse 
verbal autopsies
Laboratories Networking, stockout management, define specimens  
to be analysed
Hospitals, outpatient departments, primary care 
clinics
Organize triage, “dengue treatment units”, staff-bed-
stockout management
Logistics Supply management
Public health offices – local, regional, etc. Coordinate local actions
NGOs: nongovernmental organizations.
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4.7 Communication and social mobilization
Due to the complexity of dengue prevention and control, multisectoral cooperation that includes local health services, 
trained personnel and civil authorities is required for effective vector control and to reduce disease transmission (Hein-
tze et al. 2007).  Multifaceted interventions are more effective than single interventions, and collaboration between the 
community and authorities is crucial for their success (Parks & Lloyd, 2004; Sommerfeld & Kroeger, 2012). Thus, 
a combination of government commitment, local authority involvement and civil society mobilization is essential for 
success. How these community-based interventions are developed and the mix of the strategies available will depend 
upon the engagement of the community, and how specific behavioural changes in the target audiences can be achieved 
(Perez et al. 2007; Al-Muhandis & Hunter, 2011).  
Communication is a key component of a dengue contingency plan. While behaviour change communication (BCC) 
planning methodologies such as WHO’s Communication for Behavioural Impact (COMBI) (Parks & Lloyd, 2004) and 
the BCC Planning Cycle (Salem, Bernstein & Sullivan, 2008) are more widely used to create strategic communication 
interventions focusing on behaviour, there is a general lack of understanding on what type of communication process 
should be used during different epidemiological moments (that is, inter-epidemic, pre-outbreak, outbreak, recovery). 
Each type of communication process requires a mix of communication channels based upon the messages, urgency of 
the call to action, and the target audiences and actors involved in the response. 
Health communication is the planned and systematic use of communication strategies to inform, influence and motivate 
individual and community decisions that enhance health, health outcomes and quality of life. It is a two-way process 
that creates mutual understanding between the participants, and thus goes beyond IEC approaches, a didactic, one-way 
communication process based upon the provision of information and recommendations to a target audience. Health 
communication processes are generally used during inter-epidemic periods and may overlap with risk communication 
processes in pre-outbreak interventions. 
4.7.1 Behaviour change communication
BCC moves beyond the basic assumption of IEC that people will change their behaviour once provided with the “right” 
information. It is an evidence- and research-based process founded upon an in-depth understanding of why people “do 
what they do,” perceptions of the target audience on the issue, what internal and external factors facilitate or serve as 
barriers to the behaviour, and effective strategies to reduce behavioural barriers (Parks & Lloyd, 2004; Fox, 2012). BCC 
promotes behaviour change at individual, community, organizational, or society levels to improve health outcomes using 
a mix of communication strategies such as interpersonal communication, media (mass, traditional, alternative, social, 
print) and social mobilization (see Checklist 8). 
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CHECKLIST 8. SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
1. Develop a risk communication plan that includes communication and social mobilization activities for: 
 - pre-outbreak (preparation of messages, identification of appropriate communication channels, training of 
spokespersons, organization of social mobilization activities);
 - outbreak (dissemination of messages, call to action to reduce mortality, increase personal protection practices 
and prevention of mosquito breeding); 
 - recovery phases (dissemination of messages informing affected populations the outbreak is over, acknowledging 
their efforts to contain the outbreak, and encouragement of the  broader population to maintain prevention 
actions). See COMBI toolkit and field workbook for outbreak response (WHO 2012c; 2012d).
2. Identify the groups/communities/leaders to be targeted and their specific information needs
3. Define staff training needs
4. Develop key messages: encourage early health seeking should symptoms arise and immediate care should the 
patient have any one of the dengue warning signs, protective measures, preventative measures
5. Detail steps to be taken for collaboration/communication between community, community actors and government 
(for example, community meetings, stakeholder meetings with schools, NGOs, religious organizations, local 
businesses, municipal staff)
6. Describe advertising (number of spots, frequency of each spot, length of time each spot will air) via radio, 
television, newspapers, social media, etc. 
7. Advocate for release of funds to support implementation of Contingency Communication and Social Mobilization 
Plan
8. Describe M&E for the communication and social mobilization activities
The BCC and COMBI planning methodologies bring a behavioural focus to social mobilization, defined as a process 
of dialogue through which diverse actors are brought together to take action on an issue by creating a sense of shared 
responsibility (Parks & Lloyd, 2004; UNICEF, 2015). Social mobilization can take place at the local level through the 
mobilization of schoolchildren, women’s groups, youth groups, environmental coalitions, and professional associations, 
among others, to promote specific behaviours related to routine prevention and control or outbreak response. Social 
mobilization also takes place at the senior management level within different branches of the government at national, 
regional and municipal levels as resources are mobilized to implement the outbreak response.
4.7.2 Risk communication
A key element in managing any type of public health risk is about how it is communicated. Thus, risk communication 
is both a strategy and an interactive process of exchange of information and opinions between people, groups and 
institutions. This interactive process can be described as a dialogue whereby multiple messages are discussed together 
with the preoccupations, opinions and reactions of the population at risk (National Research Council, 1989; CDC, 
2012). It includes planning communication measures for the preparation, response and recovery from a public health 
emergency, and discusses types of risk, levels of exposure, and methods for managing risks (CDC, 2012). Community 
participation at all levels is organized and managed through the risk communication process prior to, during and after 
an outbreak. Within this context, specific measures should be initiated, such as the use of mass media, social media, 
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social mobilization and interpersonal communication. Incorporation of social media as a channel for health commu-
nication is still not widely practised and even less so in risk communication (CDC, 2012; Infanti et al. 2013). Infanti 
et al. (2013) highlight the need to update risk communication resources “…to meet new and developing needs (for 
example, strategies for effective web-based and social networking communication are notably absent yet highly relevant 
in today’s world)...” Individuals with expertise in the use of social media for health communications are notably absent 
from departments of health promotion and communication, yet the importance of social media in reaching specific 
populations is recognized (CDC, 2012). 
According to Gutierrez Blanco (2012), risk communication allows the “…expeditious control and mitigation of activities 
before a public health event occurs,” which are, among others, “…the identification and training of spokespersons, who 
are responsible for the rapid, reliable, and transparent delivery of information; the elaboration of key messages; and 
the efficient use of communication channels.” It is important to note that a good communication strategy supports a 
variety of actions, including surveillance, containment and control actions, during a public health emergency. Planning 
for outbreak response is as important, if not more important, than implementation of the response.
Seven key principles of risk communication are: (1) accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner; (2) listen to 
the audience; (3) be honest, frank and open; (4) coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources; (5) meet the 
needs of the media; (6) speak clearly and with compassion; and (7) plan carefully and evaluate performance (US Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, 2002). Unfortunately, the value of risk communication is often not understood or 
appreciated by senior management, resulting in poor communication with the affected communities, communication 
that is too late to be useful, conflicting messages issued by officials, and recommendations that are inappropriate or not 
feasible, among others. As noted by the National Research Council (1989), “…even though good risk communication 
cannot always be expected to improve a situation, poor risk communication will nearly always make it worse.” 17 
Recognizing this, WHO developed, tested and published a COMBI toolkit and field workbook (WHO 2012c; WHO 
2012d). These documents are practical and include activities across the risk communication continuum of pre-outbreak, 
outbreak and recovery. In spite of adequate planning, barriers to successful communication programmes that address 
different epidemiological moments throughout the year continue to be constrained by: (a) limited budgets; (b) a lack of 
continuous and systematic planning of communication interventions; (c) a lack of M&E; (d) challenges in measuring 
impact (Badurdeen et al. 2013); and (e) a lack of skilled staff in behaviour change and risk communication processes.
4.8 Clinical management contingency measures
Good clinical case management (see Checklist 9) in an outbreak has been crucial in reducing case fatality of dengue 
from 10–20% to less than 1% in some countries over the past two decades (Tomashek et al. 2012). The training of 
health professionals in diagnosis and management, as well as robust laboratory facilities must by prioritized, as this 
will effectively guide case management and influence mortality rates. The best ways to achieve successful training may 
be through hands-on training during ward rounds and case conferences (Pilger et al. 2010). Emergency resources and 
funding for outbreak response including clinical supplies have been highlighted as important elements of preparedness 
and response planning (WHO, 2009; Badurdeen et al. 2013).
17 Page 3.
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The low sensitivity of the DF/DHF/DSS case classification was a common barrier (Bandyopadhyay, Lum & Kroeger, 
2006). With the revised WHO classification (WHO, 2009) and case management instructions (WHO, 2012e) according 
to severity level this problem has been overcome (Horstick et al. 2012; 2014b). Identifying clinical warning signs, and 
knowing how to triage patients in the absence of laboratory test results may be crucial. For further reading see WHO’s 
handbook on the clinical management of dengue (WHO, 2012e).
CHECKLIST 9. FOR CLINICAL MANAGEMENT IT IS RECOMMENDED TO
1. Ensure hospital outbreak management plan (including recommendations for avoiding stockouts of oral rehydration 
salts, intravenous fluid, blood products, reagents, see Annex 3) 
2. Prepare special dengue units for enhanced dengue clinical management
3. Prepare for additional beds (using stretchers, discarded beds or beds from other wards, trolleys and foldable beds, 
mattresses on the floor, etc., and, if needed, establish tents with beds for intravenous fluid and observation)
4. Plan for additional staff (to be hired or transferred)
5. Establish a laboratory network which is able to handle the surge in specimens 
6. Triage system for case management and referrals (WHO, 2012e) and examples in annexes 4 and 5)
7. Ensure mortality review to help improve case management
8. Ensure transmission control in hospitals
9. Ensure timely clinical training
10. Organize emergency rooms in regional hospitals
11. Consider Hotlines for consultation
The following points should be considered when preparing a hospital outbreak management plan according to 
recommendations at a WHO consensus meeting.
Development and circulation of national guidelines on clinical management of dengue
•	 Separate guidelines for children and adults
•	 Case detection and assessment of the patient as well as admission criteria should be defined
•	 Inpatient management should be standardized
•	 Referral, discharge and follow-up should be described
Ensure training of all relevant health workers, including officers in state and private hospitals
•	 Serial system: national to provincial to district
•	 Mobile dengue team to recognize training needs given changing workforce
•	 Highlight need for training junior staff
•	 Regular training including outside outbreak period to include practical/bedside training
•	 Training of all health staff – enables reorganization in outbreak periods
•	 Referral criteria and interim stabilization, management during transfer, taking into account country geography
•	 Involvement of professional colleges to make dengue training part of continuous professional development (CPD)
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Engagement of private sector
•	 Training: may need incentives
•	 Referral of dengue patients requiring admission to public hospital
Establishment of specialist treatment areas in major hospitals and in high-risk districts
•	 Dedicated dengue wards
•	 Dedicated high-dependency units – bypasses limitation of intensive care unit (ICU) beds with specifically trained staff
•	 Specific dengue management team
•	 Early review by consultant physicians 
•	 Consider possible stockouts in the dengue prepardness plan
•	 Identification of resources for back-up stock (for example, urinary bladder catheters, bed pans, fluid-measuring 
containers for oral fluids and urine, blood pressure sets, pulse oximeters)
Dengue mortality reviews as learning tools with national input 
•	 Maintenance of good record-keeping system, for example, special monitoring charts
•	 Improve notification of suspected dengue by all clinicians for early detection of epidemics
•	 Delegate responsibilities to designated officers to ensure recording and dissemination information documentation 
and development of a Health Information System.
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Glossary of terms: list of essential elements 
of a dengue outbreak contingency plan
“Outbreak” (used synonymously with “epidemic”) is defined as a “sudden unexpected increase of cases” or as “the 
occurrence in a community or region of cases of an illness clearly in excess of expectancy” (Heymann, 2004). A “sudden 
and unexpected increase” (outbreak) is different from the seasonal peak, which is an “expected increase of cases” that 
usually occurs during the wet season. 
Dengue outbreak response has been defined as the sum of measures specifically addressing a dengue outbreak, with 
the aim of reducing case fatality rates, numbers of cases and entomological parameters (Pilger et al. 2010).
The seasonal increase of dengue cases, usually during the rainy season (see Fig. 2) has to be distinguished from the 
unexpected increase of cases above a defined threshold, which is usually called an outbreak (Stroup et al. 1989; Hey-
mann, 2004); the number of reported cases exceeding expected levels is referred to as “aberrations” (Farrington & 
Andrews, 2004). 
Passive surveillance relies on standardized reporting forms provided by the state or local health departments. These 
completed forms are returned to the health department when cases of disease are detected. Passive reporting systems 
are generally less costly than other reporting systems and data collection is not burdensome to health officials, but the 
challenge is how to increase the reporting mentality of health providers and ensure a standardized case classification 
(Thacker et al. 1986).
Active/enhanced surveillance involves outreach by the public authority, such as regular telephone calls or visits to 
laboratories, hospitals and providers, to stimulate reporting of specific diseases. It places intensive demands on resources 
and should be limited to specific purposes (Thacker et al. 1986).
Sentinel surveillance is a special form of active surveillance. It involves collecting case data from a sample of pro-
viders and then extrapolating them to a larger population. The advantage is that it is less expensive (being restricted to 
small areas) and produces data of higher quality; the disadvantage is the inability to ensure that the sample population 
is representative (Thacker et al. 1986).
Syndromic surveillance systems seek to use existing health data in real time to provide immediate analysis and feed-
back to those charged with investigation and follow-up of potential outbreaks (Henning 2004).
Shift of genotype/serotype is a change in the predominant dengue serotype or genotype in an area (WHO, 2009).
Pupal productivity surveys identify the most productive containers by counting pupae (pupal indices) in a variety 
of potential containers in an area (WHO, 2009).
Larval surveys assess the level of Aedes infestation by establishing larval indices as BI, CI and HI (WHO, 2009).
Expansion factor is a multiplication factor calculated by a cohort, sero-survey or capture-recapture studies to better 
estimate the level of dengue cases underreported in an area (Undurraga, Halasa & Shepar, 2013).
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Positive/negative predictive value (NPV); sensitivity/specificity
Dengue outbreak occurred No dengue outbreak occurred Total
Alarm (WS) present A B a+b
Alarm (WS) absent C D c+d
Total a+c b+d
WS: warning sign.
Interpretation in the context of warning signs and dengue outbreaks:
sensitivity = a/a+c  = % of outbreaks with warning signs present
specificity  = d/b+d  = % of non-outbreaks without warning signs
PPV  = a/a+b  = % of warning signs which predicted an outbreak
NPV  = d/c+d  = % without warning signs with no subsequent outbreak.
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Annexes
Annex 1. Framework for planning and implementation of a national 
dengue contingency plan
Activities Task
1. Situational analysis, 
monitor and assess the 
epidemic situation
Summarize background information, such as national dengue burden, 
national characteristics of outbreaks, health system aspects, financial, 
administrative, legal and managerial environment
Activate and maintain the situation room
Establish routine communication mechanisms with relevant national and 
international organizations
Analyse and interpret weekly data and develop a weekly outbreak report
Provide support and technical assistance to affected areas
2. Preparedness planning Review the existing protocols and develop a standardized contingency 
protocol for the country, e.g. by a planning workshop using the handbook 
and its checklist
Consider all relevant stakeholder
Adapt the standardized contingency protocol to national plans. Consider all 
relevant documents for consistency, e.g. national dengue response plans, 
surveillance guidelines, etc.
Disseminate the standardized contingency protocol and the standardized 
method for the declaration of the epidemic
3. Risk/crisis communication 
plan
Conduct ongoing training in risk/crisis communication
Activate the risk/crisis communication team
Coordinate the communication partners (media, community leaders, private 
and public sector, NGOs, stakeholders) and develop a communication 
mechanism and establish a mechanism to monitor communication 
messages and channels
Enact the national agreement on making the public announcement and 
ongoing release of information
Implement and monitor risk/crisis communication plan according to the 
phase:
pre-epidemic
epidemic alert
epidemic declare
post-epidemic
Mobilize additional resources to support the communication plan
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Activities Task
4. Disease surveillance 
system 
Standardize the methods used to determine the criteria to confirm the start 
of a dengue epidemic.
Declare the occurrence of a dengue epidemic and notify the International 
Health Regulation (IHR) and national focal points (IHR website)
Implement standardized contingency protocols, e.g. are guidelines about 
management of surveillance system as well as the national dengue control 
plan available, updated and accessible to users?
Activate the multisectoral committee to implement the national contingency 
plan
Involve the private sector as well as outpatient departments in dengue 
reporting, at least via sentinels
Establish enhanced surveillance (“active surveillance”) components (e.g. 
sub-analysis of routine data, syndromic surveillance, laboratory support, 
sentinel surveillance, motivation calls)
Monitor alarm signals for dengue outbreaks regularly and use in an 
integrated alert tool. Decide which alarm signals should be monitored
Achieve adequate timeliness of reporting (to be able to detect alarm signals 
and unusual increase of cases and to respond early) in the routine reporting 
as well as for the alarm signals
Establish a routine quality control (monitoring) of the surveillance system, 
conduct evaluation and implement recommendations
Conduct periodic training of surveillance and reporting staff
Analyse data at district level weekly, including the preparation of a epidemic 
curve, apply alarm signals and integrate into an integrated alert tool
5. Case notification, 
confirmation and reporting
Guarantee uniformity of reporting of suspected and confirmed cases 
according to definitions stated in the new WHO case classification
Prepare legal framework to include all relevant sectors/departments in 
reporting
Prepare standardized, easy-to-fill reporting form
Opt for electronic case reporting
6. Optimize the use of  
laboratory resources
Reduce lag times for receiving laboratory results (to report confirmed cases 
early to clinicians and for surveillance)
Use laboratory parameters as alarm signals, such as increased seropositivity 
and change of serotype and directly report to the surveillance system
Standardize the laboratory support (flowchart about timing of test, 
destination of samples etc.) and establish quality control
Decide on the optimal proportion of laboratory confirmation (ratio: tested/
suspected) for your setting
6. Optimize the use of  
laboratory resources 
(continued)
Monitor the proportion of laboratory positive (dengue-specific laboratory 
confirmations to dengue-specific tests requested) and decide if its increase 
can be used as alarm signal
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Activities Task
Establish laboratory networks
Conduct regular laboratory training
Decide where to mobilize additional resources when necessary
Implement the sampling criteria for confirmation of suspected cases of 
dengue to monitor the epidemic according to WHO guidelines
7. Virological surveillance Record weekly information on seropositivity ratio and decide if it could be 
integrated into the alert tool
Record monthly information on predominate serotypes and decide if it could 
be integrated into the alert tool
8. Vector surveillance Eventually perform routine larval surveys in sentinel areas and decide on 
how to do this (e.g. perifocal, over the year, before the season) and clearly 
describe
Conduct occasional pupal productivity surveys to identify productive 
containers for targeted interventions
Decide on the use of climate data for surveillance
9. Community participation/
social mobilization
Decide on communication and social mobilization strategies to be 
implemented
Decide area to be covered-entire district or focused on hot spots
Enhanced existing outreach activities following positive alarm signals
Decide whether routine activities should be carried out throughout the year 
or initiated before the dengue season (seasonal activities)
10. Outbreak preparedness 
at district level 
(implementation)
Make the response plan available to relevant staff
Conduct regular training sessions
Develop outbreak response committee and define responsibilities. Ensure 
implementation of standardized information flow that is regularly updated
Ensure that financial management is adequate for unforeseen events
Describe special arrangements for holiday periods and major festivities 
11. Outbreak preparedness 
in hospitals and health 
centres. Organize patient-
care services
Develop guidelines for response to surge of cases and case management, 
and update them Review and adapt the patient-care protocol according to 
the epidemic situation
Make guidelines available to relevant staff
Perform regular training on outbreak preparedness and case management 
for all relevant staff
Organize laboratory support and describe in guidelines (including additional 
staff requirements and additional reagents)
Define process to obtain additional budget in a timely manner
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Activities Task
11.  Outbreak preparedness 
in hospitals and health 
centres. Organize patient-
care services (continued)
Describe details on procurement issues (e.g. how to obtain additional staff 
and beds, deal with stockouts)
Describe special arrangements for holiday periods and major festivities
Conduct triage to optimize resources
12. Outbreak detection Agreed on outbreak definitions available
Is the integrated alert tool implemented and human resources/capacity for 
data analysis sufficient?
Decide on and define outbreak investigation process
Monitor the number of false alerts
Implement a process to declare an outbreak in place using an integrated 
alert tool and standardized risk and outbreak communication
Define a person/position who (technically) declares the outbreak
Agree on a method and timing on how to inform the clinicians/public about 
an outbreak
Establish the standardized use of alert signals for early response
13. Outbreak response. 
Organize the intervention, 
mobilization and 
redistribution of materials, 
pesticides, medicines, 
inputs, reagents, response 
coordination teams, and 
regional collaboration.
Intensify vector control 
measures
Develop guidelines for outbreak response and update them (see section on 
outbreak preparedness)
Make guidelines available to relevant staff and committee members
Staged response described:
initial response
early response
emergency response
Determine the needs for additional resources and regional collaboration
Ensure necessary resources are provided
Establish technical and logistical cooperation for:
communication plan
national laboratory services
patient-care service
vector control service
Implement emergency vector control procedure according to WHO 
recommendations and national contingency plan
14. Monitor and evaluate  
the contingency plan
Monitor the implementation of the contingency plan (surveillance, vector 
control, patient care, risk communication, costs)
Evaluate the efficacy of the contingency plan
Prepare and disseminate a comprehensive final report
Source: adapted from PAHO/WHO (2010).
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Annex 2. Dengue case classification
Dengue case classification by severity 
Without 
with 
warning signs 
1. Severe plasma leakage  
2. Severe haemorrhage 
3. Severe organ impairment 
Severe dengue Dengue ± warning signs 
Probable Dengue 
Live in / travel to dengue 
endemic area. Fever and  
2 of the following criteria: 
!  Nausea, vomiting 
!  Rash 
!  Aches and pains 
!  Tourniquet test +ve 
!  Leucopenia 
!  Any warning sign 
Lab. confirmed dengue 
(important when no sign of plasma 
leakage) 
Warning Signs* 
•  Abdominal pain or 
tenderness 
•  Persistent vomiting 
•  Clinical fluid accumulation 
•  Mucosal bleed 
•  Lethargy; restlessness 
•  Liver enlargement >2cm 
•  Laboratory: Increase in HCT 
concurrent with rapid 
decrease in platelet count 
* Requiring strict observation  
and medical intervention 
1. Severe plasma leakage 
leading to: 
•  Shock (DSS) 
•  Fluid accumulation with  
  respiratory distress 
2. Severe bleeding 
    as evaluated by clinician 
3. Severe organ involvement 
!  Liver: AST or ALT>=1000  
!  CNS: Impaired 
consciousness  
!  Heart and other organs 
 
Criteria for dengue ± warning signs Criteria for severe dengue 
Source: WHO/TDR (2009).
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Annex 3. Estimates for the organization of health-care activities
Estimate of dengue cases notified: 
Consider three risk scenarios according to the information of the local epidemiological surveillance system. To estimate 
inputs, equipment and materials, consider the distribution of cases within six months of the year, with the highest 
concentration in three months.
Risk scenario 1  –  1% of the population
Risk scenario 2  –  2% of the population 
Risk scenario 3  –  4% of the population
Example for a municipality of 100 000 inhabitants
Risk scenario 1 – 1000 dengue cases during six months of transmission
•	Month	1	–	130	cases
•	Month	2	–	140	cases
•	Month	3	–	200	cases
•	Month	4	–	200	cases
•	Month	5	–	200	cases
•	Month	6	–	130	cases
 
Risk scenario 2 – 2000 dengue cases during six months of transmission
•	Month	1	–	260	cases
•	Month	2	–	280	cases
•	Month	3	–	400	cases
•	Month	4	–	400	cases
•	Month	5	–	400	cases
•	Month	6	–	260	cases
Risk scenario 3 – 4000 dengue cases during six months of transmission
•	Month	1	–	520	cases
•	Month	2	–	560	cases
•	Month	3	–	800	cases
•	Month	4	–	800	cases
•	Month	5	–	800	cases
•	Month	6	–	520	cases
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Estimate of the patients that require intravenous hydration (observation):
Consider 15% of the estimate of dengue cases 
Example for a municipality of 100 000 inhabitants
Risk scenario 3 – 4000 dengue cases during six months of transmission
•	Month	1	–			520	cases	–	78	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration
•	Month	2	–	560	cases	–	84	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	
•	Month	3	–	800	cases	–	120	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	
•	Month	4	–	800	cases	–	120	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	
•	Month	5	–	800	cases	–	120	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	
•	Month	6	–	520	cases	–	78	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	
Estimate of patients that require admission to the infirmary (ward):
Consider the number of admissions to be 7% of dengue cases
For every bed, consider seven admissions in a month (occupancy – 4 days).
Example for a municipality of 100 000 inhabitants
Risk scenario 3 – 4000 dengue cases during six months of transmission
First step: estimate the number of admissions: 280 admissions during the transmission period:
•	Month	1	–	520	cases	–	36	admissions
•	Month	2	–	560	cases	–	40	admissions
•	Month	3	–	800	cases	–	56	admissions
•	Month	4	–	800	cases	–	56	admissions	
•	Month	5	–	800	cases	–	56	admissions
•	Month	6	–	520	cases	–	36	admissions
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Second step: estimate bed requirements: 1 bed/7 admissions:
•	Month	1	–	520	cases	–	36	admissions	–	5	inpatient	beds	
•	Month	2	–	560	cases	–	40	admissions	–	6	inpatient	beds
•	Month	3	–	800	cases	–	56	admissions	–	8	inpatient	beds
•	Month	4	–	800	cases	–	56	admissions	–	8	inpatient	beds
•	Month	5	–	800	cases	–	56	admissions	–	8	inpatient	beds
•	Month	6	–	520	cases	–	36	admissions	–	5	inpatient	beds.
Estimate of patients that require admission for intensive care
Consider the number of admissions to be 0.7% of dengue cases.
For every bed in intensive care, consider 6 admissions in a month (occupancy – 5 days).
Example for a municipality of 100 000 inhabitants
Risk scenario 3 – 4000 dengue cases during six months of transmission
First step: estimate admissions: 28 admissions during the transmission period: 
•	Month	1	–	520	cases	–	3	admissions
•	Month	2	–	560	cases	–	4	admissions	
•	Month	3	–	800	cases	–	6	admissions
•	Month	4	–	800	cases	–	6	admissions	
•	Month	5	–	800	cases	–	6	admissions	
•	Month	6	–	520	cases	–	3	admissions
Second step: estimate bed requirements: 1 bed/6 admissions:
•	Month	1	–	520	cases	–	3	admissions	–	1	bed	in	intensive-care	unit	(ICU)
•	Month	2	–	560	cases	–	4	admissions	–	1	bed	in	ICU
•	Month	3	–	800	cases	–	6	admissions	–	1	bed	in	ICU
•	Month	4	–	800	cases	–	6	admissions	–	1	bed	in	ICU
•	Month	5	–	800	cases	–	6	admissions	–	1	bed	in	ICU
•	Month	6	–	520	cases	–	3	admissions	–	1	bed	in	ICU.
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Prevision (forecast) of inputs, medicines and equipment required for patients in 
outpatient care and hospitalized cases
a) Complete blood count (CBC), e.g. haemogram
Consider 2 tests per patient during the transmission period (six months)
Example for a municipality of 100 000 inhabitants
Risk scenario 3 – 4000 dengue cases during six months of transmission
8000 tests required during the transmission period
•	Month	1	–	520	cases	–	1040	CBC	tests
•	Month	2	–	560	cases	–	1120	CBC	tests
•	Month	3	–	800	cases	–	1600	CBC	tests
•	Month	4	–	800	cases	–	1600	CBC	tests
•	Month	5	–	800	cases	–	1600	CBC	tests
•	Month	6	–	520	cases	–	1040	CBC	tests.
b) Oral rehydration salts (ORS)
Consider the number of dengue cases estimated x 2 x 3 (2 ORS packets per day during three days).
Example for a municipality of 100 000 inhabitants
Risk scenario 3 – 4000 dengue cases during six months of transmission
24 000 ORS packets required
•	Month	1	–	520	cases	–	3120	ORS	packets
•	Month	2	–	560	cases	–	3360	ORS	packets
•	Month	3	–	800	cases	–	4800	ORS	packets
•	Month	4	–	800	cases	–	4800	ORS	packets
•	Month	5	–	800	cases	–	4800	ORS	packets
•	Month	6	–	520	cases	–	3120	ORS	packets.
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c) Saline for intravenous fluid therapy
Consider that 15% of dengue cases require intravenous hydration x 8 x 500ml-bottles of physiological saline each.
Example for a municipality of 100 000 inhabitants
Risk scenario 3 – 4000 dengue cases during six months of transmission
600 patients require intravenous hydration – 4800 bottles of 500 ml required
•	Month	1	–	520	cases	–	78	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	–	624	bottles	(500	ml)	required
•	Month	2	–	560	cases	–	84	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	–	672	bottles	(500	ml)	required
•	Month	3	–	800	cases	–	120	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	–	960	bottles	(500	ml)	required
•	Month	4	–	800	cases	–	120	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	–	960	bottles	(500	ml)	required
•	Month	5	–	800	cases	–	120	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	–	960	bottles	(500	ml)	required
•	Month	6	–	520	cases	–	78	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	–	624	bottles	(500	ml)	required.
d) Chair for intravenous fluid therapy
Consider 15 % of the dengue cases seen per working day/month 
Example for a municipality of 100 000 inhabitants
Risk scenario 3 – 4000 dengue cases during six months of transmission
•	Month	1	–	520	cases	–	78	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	per	month	–	4	chairs
•	Month	2	–	560	cases	–	84	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	per	month	–	4	chairs
•	Month	3	–	800	cases	–	120	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	per	month	–	6	chairs
•	Month	4	–	800	cases	–	120	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	per	month	–	6	chairs
•	Month	5	–	800	cases	–	120	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	per	month	–	6	chairs
•	Month	6	–	520	cases	–	78	patients	that	require	intravenous	hydration	per	month	–	4	chairs.
It is important to note that, if necessary, the chairs can equip different health facilities according to the occurrence and 
distribution of cases. It is also necessary to assess the amount of serum stands (stand poles), taking into account that 
every stand can serve two chairs simultaneously. Equipment requirements should be assessed for the month with the 
highest number of cases in order to ensure sufficient equipment reserves.
 
72
T
R
A
IN
IN
G
 M
A
N
U
A
L
ANNEXES 
e) Medicines
Dipirona/paracetamol: consider the number of cases per period x 3 g (daily dose) x 3 days (febrile period)
Example for a municipality of 100 000 inhabitants
Risk scenario 3 – 4000 dengue cases during six months of transmission
36 000 g of medicine required during the transmission period
•	Month	1	–	520	cases	–	4680	g	of	medicine	required
•	Month	2	–	560	cases	–	5040	g	of	medicine	required
•	Month	3	–	800	cases	–	7200	g	of	medicine	required
•	Month	4	–	800	cases	–	7200	g	of	medicine	required
•	Month	5	–	800	cases	–	7200	g	of	medicine	required
•	Month	6	–	520	cases	–	4680	g	of	medicine	required.
Source: adapted from Ministry of Health, Brazil (2013).
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Annex 4. Example flowchart for triage
Source: Lum, personal communication (2015).
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Annex 5. Example assessment form for triage
Dengue Fever Assessment Form (PPUM)    Patient sticker
Date and time today: _______________________     Date & time of onset of fever: ____________________________
>72 hrs fever:  Yes / No     Place of residence:__________________________________________________ 
Initial Triage:
Cold & clammy hands: Yes / No Pulse Volume: Normal / weak
Level of Triage:  Green            Yellow            Red    
Symptoms:
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Risk factors: (Tick the boxes if yes)
Infants (<1 yr old) Hypertension Liver Failure
Pregnancy Heart Disease Staying alone
Diabetes mellitus Renal Failure >60 years age
Other diseases, describe:
NO risk factors
5-in-1 Magic Touch (CCTVR): TPR:
Colour of extremities
Body Temperature
Capillary refill time               Sec.
Temp of extremities Blood Pressure
Pulse Volume (most impt) Respiratory rate
Pulse Rate SpO
2
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3. Golden Questions (for all fever patients): 
1. Could drink at least 3 to 4 glasses in the last 12 hours No Yes
2. Passed urine at least twice in the last 12 hours No Yes
3. Able to walk around the house No Yes
Danger signs (for all fever patients):
Severe abdominal pain No Yes
Vomiting > 3X No Yes
Weakness/lethargy/confusion No Yes
Mucosal bleeding No Yes
Cold hands and feet/Pale No Yes
Breathing difficulties/Chest Pain No Yes
Dizziness/Fainting No Yes
Management:        
Discharge for Follow-up            Observation ward            Refer for Admission  
Source: Lum, personal communication (2015)
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